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Abstract 
 
Institutional investors influence corporate payout and research and 
development (R&D) investment policies. Higher payouts are encouraged by 
institutional investors, especially in firms with high free cash flow and poor 
investment opportunities. They also positively influence stock repurchases, 
particularly in firms with high information asymmetry. The substitution of stock 
repurchases for dividends as a percentage of total payout is encouraged by 
institutional investors. Institutional owners persuade firm management to 
increase research and development (R&D) investment overall and specifically in 
firms with higher stock liquidity, higher information asymmetry, lower free cash 
flow, and better investment opportunities. Institutional investors decrease agency 
costs in payout and R&D investment policy decisions. 
 1
 
 
 
 
1 Institutional Investors and Payout Policy 
1.1 Introduction 
   
Corporations have been using purposeful payout policies for quite some 
time (Lintner (1956)) despite the fact that, in theory, payouts should have no 
effect on shareholder wealth, except for perhaps negative tax consequences 
(Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Poterba and Summers (1984)). Furthermore, 
repurchases and dividends are theoretically equivalent methods of payouts 
except where tax differentials favor one method over the other. This raises 
puzzling questions articulated in Black (1976) and elsewhere as to why firms 
choose to make payouts, how do they decide how much to payout and which 
payout method to use, and what forces shape these decisions. 
One force that appears to influence the payout decisions of corporate 
managers is institutional investors. Institutional investors are organizations that 
pool large sums of money which they then invest in various companies. Banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, investment advisors, pension funds, hedge 
funds, and university endowments are the most common types of institutional 
investors. Institutions have become the dominant force in corporate ownership. 
They owned less than 10% of all U.S. stocks in 1955, 35% in 1975, and 53% in 
2000. Now, institutions own nearly 70% of the shares of U.S. corporations. The 
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predominance of institutional investors underscores the importance of the 
relationship between institutional investors and corporate financial policies. 
Institutional investors have been shown to affect corporate governance in 
many areas (See Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003)). Institutional investors should 
be better corporate stewards than individual investors because they are more 
informed and influential. On the other hand, institutional investors are agents that 
may take actions for their own benefit at the expense of their principals. One 
example in which institutional investors seem to have failed their principals as 
monitors is executive compensation. Institutional ownership has grown rapidly 
since 1980. In the meantime, the average U.S. corporate chief executive’s salary 
has grown from 42 times to 400 times an average worker’s salary without an 
accompanying improvement in firm performance.1 
Institutional investors must actively monitor management to influence 
financial policies effectively, but institutions with different characteristics have 
different incentive levels to expend costly effort to monitor. Institutional investors 
are likely to fill one or more of three roles in monitoring management: active 
monitoring, passive monitoring, or cooperating with management at the expense 
of other shareholders (Elyasiani and Jia (2010)). Since institutions are likely to be 
better informed and have larger holdings than other investors, engaging in active 
monitoring and positively influencing corporate governance is likely to lead to 
improved firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Passive institutional 
owners such as index funds and many short-term traders are likely to have little 
effect on corporate governance or firm performance. Chung and Zhang (2011) 
                                                 
1
 Bogle, John C. (2010) Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, Wall Street Journal (January 19). 
 3
find that institutional investors gravitate to companies with pre-existing good 
governance to minimize monitoring costs. Cooperating with management to 
exploit other shareholders is likely when the institution has a business 
relationship (e.g. an investment banking relationship) with the firm (Cornett et al. 
(2007)). In this paper, I investigate empirically if institutional investors monitor 
management and influence corporate payout policy. Previous theoretical and 
empirical work provides the basis for my investigation. 
 Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) develop an agency-based theory 
which implies that higher payouts keep managers in the capital markets where 
monitoring costs are lower than those alternatively incurred by current 
shareholders. Therefore, payouts reduce agency costs. Agency-based theory 
recognizes that investment policies and payout policies are not independent.  
Payouts serve to prevent management from investing excess free cash flow in 
marginal or value-reducing projects. According to agency-based theory, better 
informed investors, such as institutions, should encourage higher payouts in 
firms that are likely to overinvest. Based on this theory, I test a prediction that 
institutional investors will encourage firms to pay out more of their free cash flow, 
especially in firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. 
 Barclay and Smith (1988) and Brennan and Thakor (1990) construct an 
adverse selection theory which asserts that larger, better informed shareholders 
will prefer repurchases to dividends. In this theory, larger investors have a 
greater incentive to become informed and informed shareholders know more 
about a repurchasing company’s true value than other investors. This knowledge 
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can be used to profit at the expense of less informed shareholders. If the firm is 
undervalued, informed investors will not offer their shares for repurchase. If the 
firm is overvalued, informed investors will offer their shares for repurchase. Other 
investors don’t know enough about the company to judge if it is undervalued or 
overvalued. Therefore after repurchases are completed, informed investors will 
own proportionally more of undervalued firms and proportionally less of 
overvalued firms. In both cases, informed investors gain at the expense of other 
investors. 
 Institutional investors are considered to be better informed and generally 
have larger holdings in a firm than individual investors. Therefore, according to 
the adverse selection theory, institutional investors should prefer repurchases. 
Additionally, repurchases should become a more advantageous method of 
payout for institutional investors as the level of information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors in a firm grows. The prediction that I test 
based on the adverse selection theory is that higher institutional investor 
ownership leads to a higher level of repurchases, especially in firms with higher 
asymmetric information.   
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) document a rising trend in repurchases 
beginning in 1982 with the adoption of safe harbor provisions which removed 
regulatory constraints against repurchases. They state that from 1980 to 2000, 
repurchases grew at an average annual rate of 26.1% while dividends grew at a 
6.8% rate. As a result, share repurchases as a percentage of total dividends 
increased from 13% to 113%. Fama and French (2001) also document an 
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increase in repurchases during a similar time period. Skinner (2008) reports that 
repurchases continue to increase until the end of his study in 2004. Because of 
this trend, in 1998, for the first time in history, U.S. corporations distributed more 
cash to shareholders through repurchases than through dividends (Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000)). 
 Fama and French (2001) also provide evidence that the number of firms 
paying dividends declined dramatically during the period studied. They conclude 
that repurchases do not explain the decline in dividends as the primary effect of 
increases in the use of repurchases was to increase the payout of dividend 
payers. In contrast, Grullon and Michaely (2002) find evidence consistent with a 
substitution effect. They argue that firms are increasingly using funds for 
repurchases that would have otherwise been used for dividends. They note that 
their results differ from those of Fama and French’s because the measure of 
repurchases used by Fama and French includes not only repurchase activity, but 
also stock options used for payment to labor and new equity issuance. 
 If institutional investors prefer repurchases to dividends as predicted by 
the adverse selection theory and they therefore encourage repurchases over 
dividends as a percentage of total payouts in the firms they own, institutional 
investors may be the impetus behind the increase in repurchases as a 
percentage of total payout documented in Grullon and Michaely (2002).  
Consequently, I test a substitution hypothesis that institutional investors 
encourage a higher level of repurchases as related to dividends in the total 
payout composition. This conjecture expands on the adverse selection theory by 
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not only predicting that institutional owners will encourage repurchases, but that 
they will encourage them at the expense of dividends.  
 My results provide support for all three of the propositions that I examine: 
agency-based theory, adverse selection theory, and the substitution hypothesis. I 
find that an increase in institutional ownership leads to a rise in a firm’s total 
payout in the subsequent year, especially in firms with high free cash flow and 
poor investment opportunities. This indicates that institutional investors induce 
managers to make payouts in firms which are likely to otherwise overinvest thus 
reducing agency costs. This result provides support for the agency-based theory. 
 I also find that changes in institutional ownership have a positive 
relationship to subsequent stock repurchase activity, especially in firms with high 
information asymmetry. It could be argued that this indicates that institutional 
investors encourage higher repurchases for tax reasons, but that would not 
explain why institutions encourage repurchases more in firms with higher 
information asymmetry. It appears that institutional investors are using their 
information advantage to profit at the expense of other less informed investors 
thus providing evidence for the adverse selection theory.  
 My final result indicates that higher institutional ownership leads to a 
higher percentage of the total payout composition going to repurchases. 
Consequently, this leads to a lower percentage of the total payout mix going to 
dividends. This offers support for the substitution hypothesis and suggests that 
institutional owners are at least partially responsible for the increase of 
repurchases in relationship to dividends found in Fama and French (2001) and 
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Grullon and Michaely (2002). The empirical results on the relationship between 
institutions and dividends are not shown because, as in Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005), I do not find any evidence that institutional investors influence dividends. 
Therefore, the positive effect which I find that institutional owners have on total 
payout is entirely attributable to their positive effect on repurchase levels. 
The prevalence of institutional investors and the potential impact of their 
superior monitoring ability highlight the importance of institutional investors to 
corporate payout policies. In this paper, I investigate empirically the relationship 
between institutional investors and payout policy. The primary contribution of this 
paper is that I determine that institutional investors are a driving force behind the 
increased use of stock repurchases by U.S. corporations as a means of payout 
and as a percentage of total payout. Additionally, I find that institutional investors 
encourage repurchases primarily in firms in which they have an informational 
advantage and higher total payouts predominantly in firms that should increase 
their payouts to avoid agency problems. 
 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
1.2.1   Literature Review 
 
 Grinstein and Michaely (2005) conduct an investigation into the 
relationship between institutional investors and payout policy that is similar to 
mine. They find that low-dividend yielding stocks have higher institutional 
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ownership than high-dividend yielding stocks. They also find that dividend-paying 
firms have higher institutional ownership than non-dividend-paying firms. Their 
results indicate that institutions do not prefer dividends, but that they hold firms 
that pay dividends to comply with prudent-man rule regulations. They find no 
evidence that institutions influence dividends. They also find that institutions 
prefer firms that repurchase shares, especially if they regularly repurchase. 
Finally, they find that institutional investors do not influence repurchases or total 
payouts. This final result is at odds with my findings. 
 I can offer some explanations for the discrepancies between their results 
and mine. One likely explanation is that my definition of repurchases differs from 
theirs. My definition is similar to that used by Fama and French (2001). I define 
repurchases as the dollar amount of stock repurchases minus the dollar amount 
of stock issues. I reason that if a firm repurchases a dollar’s worth of stock in the 
same time period as the firm issues a dollar’s worth of stock, then the firm has 
not really repurchased any shares at all. I also contend that the concept of 
negative repurchases is not valid for the purposes of my investigation. Therefore, 
if the value of stock issued is more than the value of that repurchased, I define 
repurchases as being equal to zero.  In contrast, Grinstein and Michaely do not 
subtract stock issues from stock repurchases. They do not offer an explanation 
for this definition, but it is likely that their reasoning follows that expressed by 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) who argue that new equity issuance and stock 
options used for payment to labor should not be included in repurchase 
calculations. 
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 Another possible explanation for the difference in our results is that when 
they look at total payouts they only include firms in their sample that pay 
dividends and I include all firms without regard to their payout policies. Also, the 
sample they analyze concludes in 1996 while my sample runs through 2005. This 
is important because, as previously noted; repurchases have become a 
comparatively more important payout method over time. 
 There are also some methodology differences. My primary methodology 
uses change regressions. They use change regressions that are very similar to 
mine, except they use a one-digit SIC code and a time period binary variable that 
differentiates their sample into two time periods. I use firm fixed effects and a 
dummy variable for every year. Their vector-autoregressive (VAR) methodology 
is quite similar to the Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM) 
methodology I use for robustness, but there is one important difference. They 
use the level of total payouts as the dependent variable and the level of 
institutional holdings as the independent variable while I use the change in total 
payouts and institutional holdings. I used levels instead of changes to compare 
my outcomes to theirs and I obtained inconclusive results which were similar to 
theirs.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and others have theorized that large investors 
such as institutions are important monitors of firm management. Institutional 
investors can influence management through methods such as proxy votes, 
shareholder proposals, publicity generation and the threat of “voting with their 
feet” thus depressing stock share price as the shares are sold.  
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Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survey and interview CFOs who 
view institutional investors as the most important marginal investors. These 
CFOs point out that institutional investors are important because they can lower 
stock price by herding out of a stock after an earnings miss or they can provide 
easier access to capital leading to a lower future cost of capital if they are 
pleased with firm management. There is evidence that the simple act of selling 
shares can lead to governance changes that better discipline management 
(Gillan and Starks (2007)). Shareholder proposals sponsored by institutions get 
more votes and a more positive stock price reaction (Gillan and Starks (2000)). 
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) show how one institution, TIAA-CREF, 
had a high degree of success in influencing management through private 
negotiations. 
 There is ample evidence that institutions influence firm corporate 
governance and financial policies in a variety of areas. Institutional shareholders 
have been shown to: reduce empire building behavior in capital expenditures and 
acquisitions (Xu (2008)), positively influence terminations of poorly performing 
CEOs and firm valuation over time (Aggarwal et al. (2010)), have a positive 
impact on R&D and its productivity (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009)), 
and lower borrowing costs when using bonds (Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003)). 
There is also evidence that monitoring by institutional investors: leads to higher 
firm valuations and better operating performance (Ferreira and Matos (2008)), 
discourages earnings management (Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) and 
Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002)), improves return on assets (Elyasiani and Jia 
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(2010)), and improves pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation 
(Hartzell and Starks (2003)). 
 Ajinkya, Bhorjraj, and Sengupta (2005) find that firms with greater 
institutional ownership are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and that these 
forecasts are more likely to be accurate. Cornett et al. (2007) find a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and operating cash flow returns 
(though just for institutions with no business relationship with the firm). Foreign 
institutional ownership increases the probability of successful cross-border 
mergers (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010)). Institutional owners use their 
influence over management to use larger audit firms because such firms are 
perceived to provide higher quality audits (Kane and Velury (2004)). 
 There is some evidence that institutions can have a negative effect on 
corporate governance or fail to monitor management effectively. Burns, Kedia, 
and Lipson (2010) find that institutional ownership is positively related to financial 
misreporting overall, although this relationship can be modified by the nature of 
the institutional owner. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) discover that 
stock market reaction to U.K. insider transactions is higher when the dominant 
shareholders are institutions.  They argue that this indicates that institutions do 
not monitor effectively or mitigate asymmetric information problems in the U.K. 
 Several studies have found a relationship between institutional investors 
and payout policies. Lie and Lie (1999) contend that managers are more 
sensitive to shareholders’ tax situations if institutions own a higher percentage of 
the firm’s shares indicating that institutions have more influence on management 
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than other owners. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) find higher 
institutional ownership in firms that are increasing payouts, especially if the 
increased payout comes in the form of dividends. They explain that tax-exempt 
institutions that do not share in the tax benefits of repurchases may be behind 
the preference for increased dividends. It is also likely that prudent investor rules 
could be the cause of the preference for firms that increase dividends. Hankins, 
Flannery, and Nimalendran (2008) document that institutions have reduced their 
holdings in dividend-paying stocks as the “prudent investor” rule replaced the 
more-stringent “prudent man” rule in most states during the 1990s. Sulaeman 
(2008) proposes that management reacts to institutional investors’ leverage 
preferences by using repurchases to increase firm leverage if the firm’s current 
leverage is below the aggregate preference of its institutional shareholders. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) assert that special dividends are 
declining because institutional ownership levels are rising and the informational 
advantage of institutional investors allows them to discern that special dividends 
are not generally economically different from regular dividends. 
 Financial research offers many theories as to why firms make payouts, 
how payout levels are determined and why different groups of investors appear 
to prefer payouts including psychological explanations, firm quality signaling, 
cash flow uncertainty motivations, agency theories, and clientele effects. Shefrin 
and Statman (1984) argue that investor preference for cash dividends is a 
psychologically driven result of self-control problems and regret aversion.  
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 Firms may be attempting to signal future profitability by making payouts 
(Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985)). Ofer and Thakor (1987) 
develop a model in which firms signal their true value using dividends, 
repurchases or both. Vermaelen (1984) theorized that repurchases could be 
used as a credible signal of firm quality as managers of inferior firms could not 
mimic this signal without decreasing the value of their untendered shares.  There 
is evidence that signaling is occurring, although its effectiveness is questionable. 
Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007) demonstrate that a firm provides a 
positive signal about itself and a negative one about its competitors when it 
repurchases shares. This induces competing firms to make repurchases too in 
an attempt to mimic the signal. 
 Several recent studies are not supportive of signaling theory. Amihud and 
Li (2006) find that abnormal returns on dividend announcements have declined 
through the years as the level of institutional ownership has risen. They argue 
that since institutional investors are better informed the information content of 
dividend announcements has fallen. Therefore, firms have chosen to pay fewer 
dividends because the advantage of using them as costly signals of firm quality 
has fallen. The international study of Denis and Osobov (2008) casts doubt on 
the use of dividends to signal because dividends are primarily paid by firms that 
need to signal profitability the least (i.e. firms with the highest earnings). Li and 
Zhao (2008) find that firms with higher information asymmetry are less likely to 
repurchase stock or pay, initiate, or increase dividends. 
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 Fuller and Blau (2010) find some support for signaling theory in their 
proposal that different explanations for dividends are needed for different kinds of 
firms. They find that high quality firms pay dividends to dispose of excess free 
cash-flow while lower quality firms pay dividends to signal future earnings and 
reduce excess free cash flow. Their results also apply to total payout and 
repurchases.    
 Several studies have determined that free cash flow levels and 
composition are related to payouts. Firm management appears to consider the 
permanence of cash flows when considering whether to make payouts and the 
payout method to employ. Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2000) demonstrate that firms choose dividend increases to 
distribute relatively permanent cash flow changes and repurchases to distribute 
temporary cash flow increases. Their evidence appears to be related to the 
finding of Chay and Suh (2009) of a cash-flow uncertainty effect on dividends 
that is unrelated to firm maturity. They conclude that this cash-flow uncertainty 
effect is stronger than agency or investment opportunity explanations for 
dividends.  There may be an interaction between the permanence of cash flows 
and the quality of corporate governance. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find 
that firms with weaker governance (as measured by anti-takeover provisions and 
inside ownership) avoid future payout commitments by using repurchases in lieu 
of dividend increases. 
 Agency-based theories (Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)) propose 
that payouts can be used to mitigate potential overinvestment or empire building 
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problems. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) offer a “maturity 
hypothesis” to explain payouts linking the decision to pay dividends (or 
repurchase) with a firm’s age and resultant decline in risk and investment 
opportunities. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchase announcements 
get a more positive reaction among firms that are likely to overinvest. They 
interpret this as indicating that these firms are signaling a reduction in agency 
costs. Similarly, Officer (2010) finds that dividend initiations get higher 
announcement returns in firms with poor investment opportunities and high cash 
flow.  In tests on 4,000 companies from 33 countries, La Porta et al. (2000) offer 
support for an agency model that they call the “outcome model”. In this model, 
firms make payouts because the opportunities to steal or misinvest are legally 
restrained and minority investors are powerful enough to extract the payments. 
Gugler (2003) provides evidence that Austrian firms that do not have good 
growth prospects make payouts. He finds that changes in dividends result in an 
almost equal and opposite change in R&D and capital investment indicating that 
payouts compete with R&D and capital investment for internal cash flows. 
 If management’s decision to make a payout and the form of that payout 
(dividend or repurchase) is influenced by the characteristics of current 
stockholders or the type of stockholders that management wants to attract, the 
firm is said to be influenced by a clientele effect. Lee et al. (2006) find evidence 
of a clientele effect in their study of Taiwanese firms. After legalization of 
repurchases in Taiwan in 2000, firms with more heavily taxed shareholders were 
more likely to begin repurchases. This shows that management was both 
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cognizant of and deferential to their shareholders’ preferences or that 
management was pressured by shareholders to adopt a given payout policy.  
 Many financial researchers have investigated how clientele effects relate 
to institutional shareholders. This is true despite the finding of Brava et al. (2005) 
that many financial executives believe institutions are indifferent between 
dividends and repurchases. On the other hand, Jain (2007) finds that firms that 
repurchase more have higher institutional ownership and concludes that the 
institutions are attracted by the repurchasing. Bartov, Krinsky, and Lee (1998) 
find in a study of matched firms that firms with higher levels of institutional 
holdings repurchase more shares. They note that many prominent institutional 
investors, notably Fidelity, have openly expressed their preference for stock 
repurchases over dividends. They also explain that this preference is logical 
since institutions may be acting as good stewards for their investors whose 
income is taxable by reducing their taxes through the substitution for repurchases 
in place of dividends. 
 Tax differentials among varied classes of investors play a key role in 
clientele effects. Scholz (1992) finds that individual investors consider dividend 
yield and their personal tax situation when choosing investments providing 
evidence of a dividend clientele effect. Lie and Lie (1999) show that managers 
are more likely to choose repurchases as a means of payout if their firm has a 
low dividend yield indicating that they are sensitive to the tax implications of 
payouts to their shareholders. Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) find that 
institutions prefer dividends because dividends are taxed for individuals but are 
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often untaxed for institutions. Dhaliwal and Li (2006) results support this view in 
that excess trading volume around ex-dividend days is driven by tax-advantaged 
institutional investors such as pensions trading with tax-disadvantaged 
individuals. Their results also highlight the important insight that institutional 
shareholders are not necessarily homogenous. Therefore, clientele effects may 
differentiate between different types of institutional shareholders. Moser (2007) 
differentiates between classes of institutional investors and finds that firms 
increase the percentage of payouts that go towards repurchases as tax-
disfavored institutional ownership increases, but decrease the percentage as tax-
favored institutional ownership increases.  
 Renneboog and Trojanowski (2010) report a result that is inconsistent with 
tax-clientele explanations for payouts. They find that tax-exempt financial 
institutions in the U.K. prefer repurchases over dividends. On the other hand, this 
result is consistent with the adverse selection theory because the tax-exempt 
institutions’ informational advantage over other less informed investors could 
allow them to profit from repurchases at the expense of the other investors.  
 The 1982 adoption of safe harbor provisions in the U.S. which made it 
considerably easier for firms to repurchase larger quantities of their own shares 
led to an upsurge in repurchases. Because of the increase in repurchases, the 
amount of funds dispersed to shareholders in the U.S. through repurchases now 
supersedes the amount of funds paid out through dividends. Dividends also 
seem to be declining, but the evidence on this has been the subject of some 
debate. 
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 Skinner (2008) finds that there are now three main types of firms that 
make payouts: dividend payers that make regular repurchases, regular 
repurchasers, and occasional repurchasers. Firms that only pay dividends are 
now extremely rare. He argues that repurchases are fundamentally determined 
by earnings and they are increasingly replacing dividends, even for firms that still 
pay dividends. 
 Other research also supports the view that repurchases are replacing 
dividends.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue for this view and find that the 
stock market reaction to dividend cuts is much less negative for firms that are 
repurchasing shares. Li and Zhao (2008) find that firms are less likely to increase 
dividends if they repurchase more. Brockman, Howe, and Mortal (2008) contend 
that managers prefer repurchases to dividends because of tax and flexibility 
advantages, and rising stock market liquidity has enabled them to make 
repurchases their payout method of choice. Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt 
(2007) propose that stock market liquidity and dividends are viewed as 
substitutes by investors. Therefore, the decline in the propensity to pay dividends 
can largely be explained by rising stock market liquidity. Notably, they find that 
changes in repurchase and institutional ownership are not responsible for the 
decline in dividends. 
 On the other hand, there is evidence that while repurchases are rising, 
they are not acting as substitutes for dividends. Fama and French (2001) find 
that fewer firms are paying dividends, but they argue that repurchases are not 
replacing dividends because repurchases are primarily being used to increase 
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the payout of dividend payers. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) report 
that the disappearance of special dividends does not appear to be related to 
increases in repurchases.  Denis and Osobov (2008) conclude that repurchases 
are not being substituted for dividends in their study of international firms.  
 There also appears to be some question as to whether firms are actually 
paying out less in dividends and more in repurchases when adjusted for firm 
characteristics. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) argue that dividends are 
disappearing. They report a strong association between a company’s 
earned/contributed equity mix, which they use as a proxy for the life-cycle stage 
of a company, and dividends. They find that when controlling for a firm’s life-cycle 
stage that the decline in dividends is even more pronounced than the one found 
by Fama and French. Eije and Megginson (2008) provide evidence that 
dividends are declining and repurchases are growing in 15 European Union 
countries. They find that a firm’s life-cycle stage is not related to dividends in 15 
European Union countries, although the age of the firm is associated with 
increased cash payouts. 
 Grullon et al. (2010) find that the propensity to pay using either dividends 
or repurchases or both has been relatively constant over the last 30 years with 
net payouts actually increasing over time when adjusted for firm characteristics. 
Denis and Osobov (2008) also find that aggregate dividends have not declined in 
an international study. Boudoukh et al. (2007) show that payout yields have 
replaced dividend yields as a significant predictor of equity returns after the 
enactment of the safe harbor provisions indicating the rising importance of 
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repurchases and a relative stability in total payouts. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (2004) argue that aggregate real dividends paid by industrial firms have 
actually increased even though dividend payers have decreased. They find that 
the reduction in payers comes from firms that paid very small dividends and that 
the increase from the big dividend payers overwhelms the dividends not paid by 
the minor payers.  
 Baker and Wurgler (2004) present a theory that managers cater to 
investors by paying dividends when investors put a premium on dividend-paying 
stocks and by not paying dividends when investors prefer non-payers. They 
establish an empirical link between such catering and the change in propensity to 
pay dividends found in Fama and French (2001). Li and Lie (2006) extend the 
catering theory by finding support for the assertion that managers consider 
investor demand for dividends when changing existing payouts. They find that 
managers increase dividends when the dividend premium is high and increase 
repurchases when the dividend premium is low. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
argue that such catering does not occur if adjustments for firm risk as proxied by 
stock price volatility are made. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) find that 
approximately 40% of the disappearing dividends documented in Fama and 
French (2001) can be explained by firm risk as proxied by stock price volatility. 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009) provide evidence of catering in 
common law countries, but not in civil law nations. Eije and Megginson (2008) 
demonstrate that dividend catering is not occurring in 15 European Union 
countries.   
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1.2.2 Hypotheses 
 
 Agency costs are incurred by investors when a firm’s management uses 
its superior knowledge of the firm’s business activities to make decisions that 
benefit management at the expense of shareholders. Agency-based free cash 
flow theory (Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)) suggests that firms with 
higher free cash flow and poor growth opportunities should have higher payouts 
(through higher dividends or stock repurchases). The higher payouts serve to 
prevent management from using discretionary funds to invest in projects that 
provide less benefit to shareholders than the higher payouts do. Therefore, 
institutional shareholders should attempt to reduce agency costs by encouraging 
management to raise payouts.  
 Agency-based theory implies that larger institutional investor holdings will 
lead to higher payouts.  The relationship predicted by this theory should be 
stronger in firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. My 
first hypothesis is derived from the agency-based theory: 
 
H1: Greater institutional investor holdings will lead to higher payouts 
(through dividends or repurchases), especially in firms with high free cash 
flow and poor investment opportunities.  
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 The adverse selection theory of Barclay and Smith (1988) and Brennan 
and Thakor (1990) asserts that stock repurchases create an opportunity for more 
informed shareholders to profit at the expense of less informed shareholders. In 
this theory, more informed investors can more capably ascertain the true value of 
the firm. If the firm is undervalued, more informed investors will not offer their 
shares for repurchase. If the firm is overvalued, more informed investors will offer 
their shares for repurchase. Less informed investors don’t know enough about 
the company to judge if it is undervalued or overvalued.  
 Since the managers of a firm should be at least as well informed as 
institutional shareholders, the adverse selection theory relies on the presumption 
that managers will sometimes knowingly offer to repurchase shares that are 
overvalued. This is counterintuitive behavior that implies management is 
intentionally reducing the value of their firm. Yet, there is evidence that 
management engages in such behavior. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) find that 
insiders are net sellers in the year before repurchases of overvalued firms, while 
they are net buyers in the year before repurchases of undervalued firms. This 
evidence indicates that insiders are more knowledgeable about the true value of 
their firm and that they do sometimes conduct repurchases even though they are 
aware their firm is overvalued. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) provide one possible 
explanation for this behavior. They note that repurchases have been used to 
defend against hostile takeovers by increasing leverage and reducing the liquidity 
of the stock. In this case, management benefits from repurchasing overvalued 
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shares because they are more likely to retain their lucrative executive positions if 
the hostile takeover does not occur.  
 The adverse selection theory predicts that institutional investors will prefer 
repurchases if they are more informed than other investors about a firm’s true 
value. Previous research indicates that institutional investors are better informed 
than other investors. For example, Bennet, Sias, and Starks (2003) find that 
institutional investors have an informational advantage over other shareholders 
which varies with firm characteristics and information asymmetry. Institutions also 
have an informational advantage in newly public firms (Field and Lowry (2009)) 
and seasoned equity offerings (Chemmanura, He, and Hu (2009)) which is 
largely the result of better analysis of publicly available information. 
 According to the adverse selection theory, institutional shareholders prefer 
repurchases because their informational advantage allows them to ascertain the 
value of their shares more accurately than other shareholders. If a firm is difficult 
to value accurately, it is said to have higher information asymmetry (a larger 
information gap between informed and uninformed investors). Therefore, if the 
adverse selection theory holds, institutional investors should favor repurchases 
more in firms that have a higher degree of information asymmetry.  
 If institutions prefer repurchases equally in all firms, this could provide 
support for the adverse selection theory, but it also may provide evidence that 
institutions prefer repurchases for other reasons. For example, Bartov, Krinsky, 
and Lee (1998) find in a study of matched firms that firms with higher levels of 
institutional holdings repurchase more shares. They argue that institutions prefer 
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repurchases over dividends to lower the tax burden on their taxable 
shareholders. Their reasoning can explain a preference for repurchases by 
institutions, but unlike the adverse selection theory, this tax effect should not be 
more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetry. My next hypothesis 
is based on the adverse selection theory: 
  
H2: Higher institutional investor ownership leads to a higher level of 
repurchases, especially in firms with higher asymmetric information. 
 
 If institutional investors prefer repurchases to dividends as predicted by 
the adverse selection theory, institutional investors may be the driving force 
behind the gradual substitution of repurchases for dividends found by Grullon 
and Michaely (2002). As a result, institutional investors may encourage 
repurchases over dividends as a method of payout. This substitution hypothesis 
predicts that an increase in institutional ownership will lead to an increase in 
repurchases as a percentage of total payout. 
 
H3: Higher institutional investor ownership leads to a higher percentage of 
total payout going toward repurchases and a lower percentage of total 
payout going towards dividends. 
 
 An endogenous relationship exists between institutional investors and 
payout policy so simply showing a relationship between institutional investors 
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and payout policy will not provide sufficient evidence to support any of the payout 
policy theories presented in this paper. Causality is also important. The causal 
relationships in the payout policy theories state that all else being equal: agency-
based theory predicts that institutional investor changes influence total payout 
(dividends and stock repurchases) policy changes, adverse selection theory 
predicts that institutional investor changes influence stock repurchase policy 
changes, and the substitution hypothesis states that institutional investors have a 
positive influence on the percentage of total payout which is made up of stock 
repurchases.  
 
1.3 Data, Methods, and Summary Statistics  
 
1.3.1  Data and Methods 
 
 I gather yearly institutional and insider ownership data from CDA / 
Spectrum Compact Disclosure for each year from 1990 to 2005. Financial firms 
and utilities are excluded because they are highly regulated by the government. 
The ownership data is then merged with Compustat data. The final sample 
includes 10,668 firms and 79,890 firm-years. Some firms are missing data or not 
present in the sample for enough firm-years to perform certain analysis. In such 
cases, they are not used.  
 Annual dividends and stock repurchases are measured in dollars and 
scaled by the dollar book value of assets. Repurchases are defined as the dollar 
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amount of stock repurchases minus the dollar amount of stock issues. If stock 
issues are greater than stock repurchases, the repurchase amount is set to zero. 
Changes in repurchases are measured as the repurchases of the current year 
minus repurchases of the previous year, divided by previous year book value of 
assets. Changes in dividends are measured similarly. Total payout is defined as 
the sum of the dollar value of common dividends and repurchases. 
Fama and French (2001) find in a study of U.S. firms that dividends are 
trending through time. They also find that firm profitability, size and growth 
opportunities are related to dividends. Therefore, I control for differences across 
firms using variables that control for these relationships. Profitability is proxied by 
earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. Size is measured using 
log of market value and log of revenue. I use q to control for growth opportunities. 
Following Dlugosz et al. (2006), I calculate the variable q as the ratio of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets where market value is 
calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of 
common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. All 
regressions include dummy variables for each year of the data sample to control 
for time effects on the relationship between institutional ownership and payouts.  
 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) report a strong association 
between a company’s earned/contributed equity mix, which they use as a proxy 
for the life-cycle stage of a company, and dividends. Therefore, the 
earned/contributed equity mix defined as retained earnings to the book value of 
total equity is used to control for firm life-cycle stage. Firm stock turnover is 
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included as a control because Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) find that 
turnover is related to dividends. Jensen (1986) proposes debt can substitute for 
dividends, so firm debt to asset ratio is included.  
 The measure of cash flow used in my analysis of agency-based free cash 
flow theory is net income plus depreciation and amortization minus capital 
expenditures. Notably, this cash flow measure does not subtract dividends or 
repurchases as many measures of cash flow do. This is done to simplify the 
analysis of dividends, repurchases or payouts as a percentage of free cash flow. 
The cash flow measure is divided by total book value of assets to provide scale. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Table 1 - 1. 
If there is a relationship between institutional investors and payouts, it is 
difficult to discern if institutional investors influence payouts or if payouts 
influence institutional investors or both. Therefore, I have to adopt a regression 
methodology which accounts for endogeneity and establishes causality.2  
To help address this causality issue, I run regressions on changes in 
dependent variables from year t – 1 to t on changes in independent variables 
from t – 2 to t – 1 to establish causality. All regressions use firm fixed effects.  
Firm fixed effect regressions are useful because they control for all stable 
characteristics of a firm (including industry), whether measured or not. This 
appealing feature of firm fixed effects regressions combined with the use of 
yearly dummy variables to control for time-varying omitted characteristics helps 
to control for endogeneity issues in my analysis. Using the yearly dummy 
                                                 
2
 I attempted two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variables) regressions but was unable to 
come up with instrumental variables which were statistically and conceptually sound. 
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variables with fixed effects effectively gives each year its own intercept. 
Intercepts in fixed effects regressions are calculated as an average value of the 
unobserved fixed effects for each firm which is not relevant in my analysis. The 
yearly intercept values are also not relevant to my analysis. Therefore, the 
intercept term and yearly dummy coefficients are not reported in my regression 
results. 
It is highly probable that the relationship between institutional ownership 
and payouts is an endogenous one. Although I use control variables in the 
change regressions to control for endogeneity, it is still desirable to use an 
alternate method to further address potential endogeneity.  Therefore, I also use 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(difference GMM) methodology. This methodology is ideal for use in panel 
samples with a limited number of time periods and a large number of firms. 
Difference GMM is useful when independent variables are not strictly exogenous 
and when firm fixed effects exist. An in-depth explanation of the difference GMM 
method used in this paper is included in Appendix C. 
 
1.3.2 Summary Statistics and Data Correlations 
 
 Table 1 - 2 displays selected firm characteristics for my sample. Panel A 
includes all firms in the sample and panel B includes only firms that have a 
payout (either dividends or stock repurchases or both). Statistics are shown for 
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two time periods, 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005, and for the total sample. Means 
are shown and medians are shown in parentheses below. 
 Some patterns appear in the data for all firms and in firms with a payout. 
The percentage ownership of institutional investors (Inst) increases over time. 
Firm size (MktCap) and q increase from the first time period to the next as well. 
Retained earnings to total equity (LifeCycle), a proxy for firm life-cycle, indicates 
that firms included in the sample are less mature in the later years. The median 
firm retained earnings to total equity is positive demonstrating that in most firm-
years, firms are mature enough to have earned positive earnings during their 
lifetime. In contrast, the average retained earnings to total equity is negative 
indicating a skewness towards the large minority (over 38%) of the firm-years 
with negative retained earnings. 
 Firms with a payout have higher institutional ownership, a larger size and 
a lower q than those without a payout. Firms that have a payout have a higher 
median and slightly lower mean in retained earnings to total equity.  
Table 1 - 2 also displays summary statistics for payout-related variables in 
Panels C and D. Only means are shown because medians are zero for almost all 
of the variables. As expected, all payout variables are lower in Panel C which 
includes all firms than in Panel D which only includes firms that have a payout. 
Consistent with Fama and French (2001), dividends to assets (Div) goes down 
over time as repurchases to assets (Repurch) goes up. Total payout increases 
(PayIncr) outnumber total payout decreases (PayDecr). The percentage of firms 
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increasing repurchases per share (RepIncr) is higher than the percentage of 
firms decreasing repurchases per share (RepDecr).  
Table 1 - 3 presents a correlation table for selected firm variables which 
are important in my analysis. Correlations that are significant at the 5% level are 
marked with an asterisk. Total payout to assets (Payout) is significantly positively 
correlated with repurchases to assets (Repurch), institutional ownership (Inst) 
and market value of common stock (MktCap). Repurchases to assets is 
significantly positively correlated with institutional ownership and market value of 
common stock.  
Institutional ownership is significantly positively correlated with market 
value of common stock and negatively correlated with Tobin’s q (q). Market value 
of common stock, retained earnings to total equity and Tobin’s q are all not 
significantly correlated with each other. 
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Table 1 - 1: Variable Definitions - Payouts 
Variable Description Definition 
Panel A: Summary Statistics and Correlation Table Variables 
N Number of Firms The number of firms.  
Inst Institutional Ownership The fraction of shares owned by institutions. 
MktCap Market Capitalization The dollar market value of common stock in 
millions.  
LifeCycle Firm Life-cycle The ratio of retained earnings to total equity.  
q Investment Opportunities Market value of assets to the book value of assets 
CashFlow Free Cash Flow Free cash flow to total assets. 
Div Dividend Ratio Dividends to book value of assets.  
Payout Payout Ratio Total payout divided by book value of assets.  
Repurch Stock Repurchase Ratio Stock repurchases to book value of assets.  
PayIncr Payout Increases The percentage of firms which increased their total payout per share.  
PayDecr Payout Decreases The percentage of firms which decreased their total payout per share.  
RepIncr Stock Repurchase Increases 
The percentage of firms which increased their 
repurchases per share.  
RepDecr Stock Repurchase Decreases 
The percentage of firms which increased their 
repurchases per share. 
Panel B: Regression Dependent Variables  
(Measured as changes in values from year t – 1 to t.) 
Payout Payout Ratio Total payout divided by book value of assets.  
Repurch Stock Repurchase Ratio Stock repurchases to book value of assets.  
Panel C: Regression Independent Variables 
 (Measured as changes in values from year t – 2 to t - 1.) 
Inst Institutional Ownership The fraction of shares owned by institutions. 
CashFlow Free Cash Flow Free cash flow to total assets. 
q Investment Opportunities Market value of assets to the book value of assets 
Debt Debt Ratio Debt to assets.  
Turnover Stock Turnover Firm common stock turnover. 
LifeCycle Firm Life-cycle The ratio of retained earnings to total equity.  
MktCap Market Capitalization The dollar market value of common stock in 
millions.  
ROA Return on Assets Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets.  
Insider Insider Ownership The fraction of shares owned by insiders.  
Insider2 Insider Ownership Squared The squared value of Insider.  
Revenue Revenue The logarithm of firm revenue. 
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Table 1 - 2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: All Firms 
Years N Inst MktCap LifeCycle q CashFlow 
1990 - 1997 37,492 28.9% 2,106 -0.69 2.81 -0.16 
  (23.6%) (163) (0.29) (1.85) (0.01) 
1998 - 2005 42,398 33.3% 4,891 -0.53 4.68 -0.39 
  (25.8%) (350) (0.18) (1.86) (0.01) 
Total 79,890 31.3% 3,603 -0.61 3.81 -0.28 
  (24.6%) (239) (0.24) (1.85) (0.01) 
Panel B: Firms with a Payout 
1990 - 1997 13,934 37.9% 4,858 0.46 2.07 0.03 
  (38.0%) (547) (0.64) (1.75) (0.04) 
1998 - 2005 15,716 42.8% 10,806 -1.49 2.22 0.02 
  (43.9%) (1,146) (0.57) (1.75) (0.04) 
Total 29,650 40.5% 8,030 -0.57 2.15 0.02 
  (40.4%) (816) (0.61) (1.75) (0.04) 
       
Panel C: All Firms 
Years Div Repurch PayIncr PayDecr RepIncr RepDecr 
1990 - 1997 0.81% 0.60% 24.80% 18.70% 13.66% 12.79% 
1998 - 2005 0.66% 1.04% 24.57% 20.65% 17.56% 16.58% 
Total 0.73% 0.83% 24.67% 19.78% 15.82% 14.89% 
Panel D: Firms with a Payout 
1990 - 1997 2.21% 1.64% 65.60% 33.06% 35.82% 21.84% 
1998 - 2005 1.80% 2.82% 64.70% 34.83% 45.65% 26.90% 
Total 2.00% 2.26% 65.10% 34.04% 41.29% 24.66% 
Panels A and B, show means on the first row and medians in parentheses on the 
second row. In Panels C and D, means are shown. 
 
Table 1 - 3: Correlations 
 Payout Repurch Inst MktCap LifeCycle q 
Repurch 0.6528*      
Inst 0.0801* 0.0957*     
MktCap 0.0539* 0.0332* 0.0865*    
LifeCycle 0.0008 0.0004 0.0013 0.0009   
q  -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0135* -0.0019 0.0013  
CashFlow 0.0032 0.0024 0.0232* 0.0023 -0.0008 -0.4194* 
* indicates two-tailed significance at 5%. 
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1.4 The Effect of Institutional Owners on Total Payouts 
 
1.4.1 Do Institutional Owners Influence Total Payouts? 
 
 According to the agency-based free cash flow theory, current institutional 
owners positively influence future total payouts (dividends and repurchases). 
Since I have no predictions on how payouts affect institutional holdings, I only 
analyze the effect of institutional ownership on payouts. Institutional investor 
ownership and payout levels are almost certainly endogenously related. Firms 
with higher payout levels tend to have higher institutional ownership levels, so I 
need to combat the effect that this endogenous relationship has on my analysis. 
Therefore, I test the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on 
subsequent changes in payouts rather than looking at their levels.  
 To test the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on changes 
in payouts in the subsequent year, the following firm and year fixed effects model 
is estimated. 
 
(1-1)
 
ititititit ControlInstFirmYearPayout εβ +•+++= −− 11
 
 
 Payoutit represents the firm’s payout to asset ratio. Yeart represents year 
fixed effects and Firmi represents firm fixed effects.  Instit-1 is the percentage of 
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the firm’s shares owned by institutional investors. Controlit-1 represents a vector 
of time-varying firm level control variables (q, debt, stock turnover, retained 
earnings to total equity, log of market capitalization, ROA, insider ownership, 
insider ownership squared, and log of revenue), and εit is the error term.  
 The independent variables are measured as the change from year t – 2 to 
year t – 1. The dependent payout variable is measured as the change from year t 
- 1 to year t. 
 Table 1 - 4 reports on the effect that changes in institutional ownership 
have on total payout to assets ratios (Payout) in the subsequent year using firm 
and year fixed effects model (1-1). The first regression only uses the control 
variables as independent variables. The statistically significant coefficients 
indicate that payouts increase as q decreases, debt decreases, market 
capitalization increases, and return on assets decreases. Payouts also increase 
for small decreases in insider ownership. The control variable results remain 
largely consistent in the other regressions shown in the table. 
 The second regression includes the variable (Inst) representing the 
change in the percentage of institutional ownership. The statistically significant 
coefficient shows that an increase in institutional ownership leads to an increase 
in payout levels in the subsequent year.  
 Statistical significance is important to my analysis, but practical (or 
economic) significance is as well. Therefore, I use an example to give some 
perspective as to the magnitude of the effect of institutional ownership on 
payouts. For this example, I use a hypothetical firm with an institutional 
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ownership percentage (40%) and a payout to assets ratio (1.900%) quite close to 
the sample median for firms with payouts. It is important to note for this analysis 
that institutional ownership percentage is measured from 0% to 100% (or 0 to 1). 
Using the coefficient in the second regression (0.0106), a rise from 40% to 50% 
institutional ownership should lead to an additional 0.106% in the payout ratio, all 
else being equal. In this example, the firm’s payout ratio would subsequently 
increase from 1.900% to 2.006%.  
 Institutional ownership percentages are higher in firms with payouts than 
in firms without payouts. Therefore, the results discussed thus far could be 
influenced by the tendency of institutional investors to invest more in firms that 
had a payout. To attenuate that influence, the third regression is ran only on firms 
that did not have a payout in year t – 2. Regression (3) shows that institutional 
owners have a significantly positive effect on future payouts in firms that did not 
have a payout in the previous year. The fourth regression shows that an increase 
in institutional ownership leads to an increase in payouts among firms that had a 
payout in the previous year as well. In this case though, the t-statistic shows that 
the coefficient falls just a little short of the 10% significance level (with a p-value 
of 0.103). 
 Institutional investors use their influence to raise total payouts. Results for 
robustness checks using the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference Generalized 
Method of Moments (difference GMM) methodology to further control for 
endogeneity and using data from the years 1990-1997 and 1998-2005 separately 
confirm this finding. Robustness tests are shown and discussed in Appendix A. 
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1.4.2 Are Potential Agency Problems a Factor? 
 
 According to agency-based theory, institutional investors should not only 
encourage higher payouts, they should encourage higher payouts primarily in 
firms with poor investment opportunities. I test this prediction using q as a proxy 
for investment opportunities. I sort the sample of firms each year into investment 
opportunity deciles. I assign each firm-year to one of three groups. Firms in the 
bottom three deciles (Low q) have poor investment opportunities, those in the 
next four deciles (Medium q) have moderate investment opportunities, and those 
in the highest three deciles (high q) have good investment opportunities.  
 I then run regressions using the firm and year fixed effects model (1-1) 
that show the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on total payout 
to assets ratios (Payout) in the subsequent year. I add a new control variable, 
free cash flow (CashFlow), to the model because of its importance to the agency-
based theory. Regressions are run on the low q, medium q, and high q groups 
separately based on which group a firm is in during year t – 1. The results are 
shown in Table 1 - 5. 
 The first and second regressions, which include only firms in the poor and 
moderate investment opportunities groups respectively, have a significantly 
positive coefficient for the variable Inst. This indicates that an increase in 
institutional ownership leads to an increase in payouts for these groups. The third 
regression indicates that institutional owners do not have a significant effect on 
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payouts in firms with good investment opportunities. This pattern is consistent 
with the agency-based theory. 
 Agency-based theory also predicts that institutional investors should 
encourage higher payouts primarily in firms with high free cash flow. I test this 
prediction by assigning each firm-year to one of three groups: low cash flow 
(bottom three deciles), moderate cash flow (middle four deciles), and high cash 
flow (top three deciles). Once again, I use the firm and year fixed effects model 
(1-1) to access the impact institutional ownership has on payouts in the 
subsequent year. The results are shown in Table 1 - 6. 
 The first regression shows that institutional owners have no effect on 
payouts in firms with low free cash flow. Higher payouts are encouraged by 
institutional owners in the moderate cash flow firms. In the group of firms with the 
highest cash flow, institutional investors have the strongest positive influence on 
total payouts. Consistent with agency-based theory, the pattern indicates that an 
increase in institutional ownership leads to a stronger increase in payouts as free 
cash flow increases. 
 Institutional investors encourage higher payouts, especially in firms with 
poor investment opportunities or high free cash flow.  Robustness checks using 
groups formed on the basis of a combination of firm investment opportunities and 
free cash flow and using difference GMM methodology support this result. The 
robustness tests are reported and discussed in Appendix A. 
 My results provide evidence that an increase in institutional investors 
leads to a subsequent increase in total payout. Additionally, the evidence 
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demonstrates that institutional investors use their influence to encourage higher 
payouts primarily in firms that are the most prone to agency problems, those with 
poor investment opportunities and high free cash flow. The results support the 
agency-based theory prediction that institutional owners encourage higher 
payouts to prevent management from misusing discretionary funds.  
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Table 1 - 4: Institutional Ownership and Payouts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Firms All Firms No Payout 
at year t - 2 
Payout at 
year t - 2 
 
Payout Payout Payout Payout 
Inst 
 0.0106*** 0.0072** 0.0182 
 
 (2.75) (2.19) (1.63) 
   q -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0002** -0.0063*** 
 (3.21) (3.16) (2.03) (2.68) 
Debt -0.0114*** -0.0115*** -0.0031** -0.1961*** 
 (3.08) (3.01) (2.21) (4.64) 
Turnover 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0043** 
 (0.56) (0.33) (0.27) (2.13) 
LifeCycle -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* 
 (0.95) (1.05) (0.15) (1.82) 
MktCap 0.0081*** 0.0073*** 0.0031*** 0.0456*** 
 (6.48) (6.58) (3.11) (6.16) 
ROA -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0003 -0.0395*** 
 (2.16) (2.25) (1.03) (3.10) 
Insider -0.0196* -0.0205* -0.0141 -0.0271 
 (1.88) (1.95) (1.63) (1.01) 
Insider2 0.0137 0.0146 0.0158* 0.0189 
 (1.29) (1.36) (1.72) (0.68) 
Revenue -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0090 
 (1.19) (1.24) (1.32) (1.64) 
Observations 45,418 44,933 25,794 19,096 
Firms 7,782 7,759 6,239 4,244 
R-squared 0.06 0.16 0.34 0.17 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect regressions 
of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in total payout divided by book value of 
assets (Payout). All independent variable values are calculated as 
changes in that independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. 
Regressions (1) and (2) include all firms. Regression (3) includes only 
firms that had no payout in year t - 2 and regression (4) includes only 
firms that had a payout in year t - 2. 
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Table 1 - 5: Institutional Ownership, Payouts and, Investment Opportunities 
 
Low q Medium q High q 
 
Payout Payout Payout 
Inst 0.0173* 0.0188*** 0.0080 
 (1.91) (2.97) (1.07) 
CashFlow -0.0016 -0.0059* 0.0051*** 
 (1.15) (1.72) (3.28) 
   q 0.0058** -0.0021*** -0.0004*** 
 (2.15) (2.60) (2.76) 
Debt -0.0132 -0.0296*** -0.0033* 
 (1.42) (2.61) (1.95) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.0014*** -0.0009** 
 (0.12) (2.86) (2.44) 
LifeCycle -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.94) (0.81) (0.31) 
MktCap 0.0046* 0.0209*** 0.0073*** 
 (1.74) (5.06) (4.07) 
ROA 0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0057*** 
 (0.28) (0.55) (3.80) 
Insider -0.0119 -0.0435** 0.0047 
 (0.40) (2.12) (0.30) 
Insider2 0.0094 0.0416* -0.0154 
 (0.34) (1.95) (0.72) 
Revenue -0.0023 -0.0063 0.0003 
 (0.60) (1.24) (0.24) 
Observations 13004 18829 12403 
Number of Firms 3971 5504 3793 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.42 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in total payout 
divided by book value of assets (Payout). All independent 
variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions 
(1), (2), and (3) include only Low, Medium and High q firms, 
respectively. The Low, Medium and High q groups include the 
lowest three, middle four, and highest three q deciles from year t 
- 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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Table 1 - 6: Institutional Ownership, Payouts, and Free Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Low 
CashFlow 
Medium 
CashFlow 
High 
CashFlow 
 
Payout Payout Payout 
Inst 0.0003 0.0093* 0.0271** 
 (0.04) (1.86) (2.14) 
CashFlow -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0005 
 (0.90) (0.10) (0.35) 
   q -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0025*** 
 (1.50) (2.42) (3.24) 
Debt -0.0003 -0.0643*** -0.0788* 
 (0.54) (4.54) (1.75) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.0006** -0.0027 
 (0.19) (2.17) (1.63) 
LifeCycle -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.08) (0.48) (1.00) 
MktCap 0.0033 0.0076*** 0.0260*** 
 (1.60) (5.26) (4.76) 
ROA 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0217*** 
 (0.37) (0.17) (2.61) 
Insider -0.0075 -0.0129 -0.0229 
 (0.25) (0.80) (1.33) 
Insider2 0.0010 0.0089 0.0155 
 (0.03) (0.53) (0.80) 
Revenue -0.0010 -0.0038** -0.0061 
 (0.62) (1.98) (0.81) 
Observations 11014 18905 14317 
Number of Firms 4530 5591 4457 
R-squared 0.47 0.43 0.25 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in total payout divided 
by book value of assets (Payout). All independent variable values 
are calculated as changes in that independent variable from year t 
- 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) 
include only Low, Medium and High CashFlow firms, respectively. 
The Low, Medium and High CashFlow groups include the lowest 
three, middle four, and highest three CashFlow deciles from year t 
- 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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1.5 The Effect of Institutional Owners on Stock Repurchases 
 
1.5.1  Do Institutional Owners Influence Stock Repurchases? 
 
 The adverse selection model predicts that an increase in current 
institutional ownership will lead to an increase in future repurchases. Institutional 
ownership levels and stock repurchase levels have an endogenous relationship. 
Therefore, I test the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on 
subsequent changes in repurchases.  
 To test the influence that institutional owners have on future repurchases, 
the following firm and year fixed effects model is estimated. 
 
(1-2)
 
ititititit ControlInstFirmYearRpurch εβ +•+++= −− 11
 
 
 This model is identical to model (1-1) except for the dependent variable. In 
this model, Rpurchit represents the change in the repurchase to asset ratio for 
each firm in each year. As in model (1-1), the independent variables are 
measured as the change from year t – 2 to year t – 1. The dependent repurchase 
variable is measured as the change from year t - 1 to year t. 
 Table 1 - 7 reports on the effect that changes in institutional ownership 
have on stock repurchases (Repurch) in the subsequent year. The first 
regression only uses the control variables as independent variables. The 
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statistically significant coefficients indicate that repurchases increase as q 
decreases, debt decreases, retained earnings to total equity decreases, market 
capitalization increases, and return on assets decreases. The results for the 
control variables remain largely consistent throughout the rest of the regressions 
shown in the table. 
 In the second regression, I add a variable (Inst) representing the change 
in total institutional ownership. There is a positive and significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and subsequent stock repurchases.  
 Institutional owners prefer to own firms that repurchase stock. Therefore, 
the results in the second regression could be influenced by the tendency of 
institutional investors to invest more in firms that have repurchased stock 
previously. To alleviate that influence, the third regression is ran only on firms 
that did not have a repurchase in year t – 2. The third regression demonstrates 
that institutional owners have a significantly positive influence on future stock 
repurchases in firms that did not repurchase stock in the previous year. The 
fourth regression shows that institutional owners encourage higher repurchases 
in firms that had repurchases in the previous year. 
 Institutional investors encourage firm management to increase stock 
repurchases. Results for robustness checks, which are shown in Appendix A, 
using data from the years 1990-1997 and 1998-2005 separately confirm this 
result.  
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1.5.2 Is Information Asymmetry a Factor?  
 
 Adverse selection theory predicts that institutional investors will use their 
influence to persuade management to increase repurchases. Additionally, the 
theory predicts that institutional investors will find repurchases more attractive as 
information asymmetry increases. I test this prediction using retained earnings to 
total equity (LifeCycle) as a proxy for information asymmetry. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) use this measure as a proxy for firm life-cycle. They 
assert that this is a valid proxy for firm information asymmetry. This relationship 
between firm life-cycle and information asymmetry seems logical because the 
further along a firm is in its life-cycle the more information an investor will have 
about the firm to judge its prospects, all else being equal.  
 I sort the sample of firms each year into information asymmetry deciles. I 
assign each firm-year to one of three groups. Firms in the bottom three deciles 
(Early LifeCycle) have high information asymmetry, those in the next four deciles 
(Middle LifeCycle) have moderate information asymmetry, and those in the 
highest three deciles (Late LifeCycle) have low information asymmetry. 
  I then run regressions using the firm and year fixed effects model (1-2) 
that show the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on repurchases 
in the subsequent year. Regressions are run on the high, moderate, and low 
information asymmetry groups separately based on which group a firm is in 
during year t – 1. The results are shown in Table 1 - 8.  
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 The first two regressions show that institutional investors encourage 
increased repurchases in firms with high and moderate information asymmetry. 
The third regression shows a statistically weak positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and future stock repurchases in low information 
asymmetry firms. It is notable that the Inst coefficient for the low information 
asymmetry firms group is higher than for the other two groups despite not being 
statistically significant. This may be explained by the higher propensity of firms 
with low information asymmetry to make repurchases. This higher propensity is 
shown in the average repurchase to asset ratios for the three groups (not 
shown): high information asymmetry (0.36%), moderate information asymmetry 
(0.64%), and low information asymmetry (1.55%). The results shown in this table 
provide evidence that supports the adverse selection theory. A robustness test 
using the difference GMM methodology confirms this result. It is shown in 
Appendix A. 
 Institutional investors use their influence to persuade management to 
increase repurchases. This relationship is more significant in firms with higher 
information asymmetry. This evidence provides support for the adverse selection 
theory which predicts that institutional owners encourage higher stock 
repurchases to gain an advantage over other less informed investors.  
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Table 1 - 7: Institutional Ownership and Stock Repurchases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Firms All Firms 
No 
Repurchase 
at year t - 2 
Repurchase 
at year t - 2 
 
Repurch Repurch Repurch Repurch 
Inst 
 0.0104*** 0.0098*** 0.0220* 
 
 (3.15) (3.16) (1.66) 
   q -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0108*** 
 (3.03) (2.96) (2.20) (4.69) 
Debt -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -0.0057** -0.2002*** 
 (2.99) (2.92) (2.21) (5.31) 
Turnover 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0046*** 
 (0.68) (0.43) (0.49) (2.97) 
LifeCycle -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000** 
 (2.51) (2.75) (0.47) (1.97) 
MktCap 0.0066*** 0.0058*** 0.0035*** 0.0527*** 
 (6.41) (6.83) (4.24) (7.56) 
ROA -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0005 -0.0647*** 
 (2.27) (2.34) (1.54) (4.97) 
Insider -0.0110 -0.0119 -0.0045 -0.0557 
 (1.51) (1.62) (0.86) (1.47) 
Insider2 0.0085 0.0094 0.0076 0.0404 
 (1.12) (1.23) (1.37) (1.02) 
Revenue -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0044 
 (0.93) (1.02) (1.64) (0.72) 
Observations 45611 45126 34083 11043 
Firms 7801 7778 7525 3588 
R-squared 0.05 0.19 0.33 0.25 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect regressions of 
changes (from year t - 1 to t) in repurchases divided by book value of 
assets (Repurch). All independent variable values are calculated as 
changes in that independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions 
(1) and (2) include all firms. Regression (3) includes only firms that had 
no payout in year t - 2 and regression (4) includes only firms that had a 
payout in year t - 2. 
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Table 1 - 8: Institutional Ownership, Repurchases, and Firm Life-cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Early 
 LifeCycle 
Middle 
LifeCycle 
Late 
 LifeCycle 
 
Repurch Repurch Repurch 
Inst 0.0131** 0.0058* 0.0216 
 (2.01) (1.94) (1.48) 
   q -0.0004 -0.0009*** -0.0003* 
 (1.23) (4.85) (1.79) 
Debt -0.0025 -0.0298*** -0.0071* 
 (0.63) (6.01) (1.96) 
Turnover -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0039* 
 (0.42) (3.03) (1.67) 
LifeCycle -0.0000*** 0.0001 -0.0000 
 (2.68) (0.63) (0.77) 
MktCap 0.0020 0.0077*** 0.0173*** 
 (1.48) (6.19) (5.02) 
ROA 0.0005 0.0026 -0.0014** 
 (0.25) (0.45) (2.13) 
Insider 0.0093 -0.0017 -0.0457* 
 (0.96) (0.23) (1.83) 
Insider2 -0.0117 0.0016 0.0346 
 (0.83) (0.19) (1.45) 
Revenue -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0005 
 (0.89) (0.60) (0.29) 
Observations 11505 18633 14988 
Number of Firms 3639 4730 3093 
R-squared 0.17 0.28 0.32 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in repurchases 
divided by book value of assets (Repurch). All independent 
variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions 
(1), (2), and (3) include only Early, Middle and Late LifeCycle 
firms, respectively. The Early, Middle and Late LifeCycle groups 
include the Earliest three, Middle four, and Latest three LifeCycle 
deciles from year t - 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a 
yearly basis. 
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1.6 The Effect of Institutional Owners on Payout Composition 
 
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that repurchases are gradually being 
substituted for dividends. The substitution hypothesis suggests that institutional 
shareholders are encouraging the trend towards increased repurchases in lieu of 
dividends. This hypothesis predicts that an increase in institutional ownership will 
lead to an increase in repurchases as a percentage of total payout.  
 To test this prediction, I use a measure of payout composition that 
evaluates the contribution to total payout made by dividends and stock 
repurchases equally. The measure which is calculated for each firm for each year 
is represented by PayComp and is shown in equation (1-3). 
 
(1-3)
 
DivRpurch
DivRpurchPayComp
+
−
=
 
 
 In equation (1-3), Rpurch is the dollar value of stock repurchases and Div 
is the dollar value of common stock dividends. PayComp is undefined for firms 
with no payouts. It is equal to zero for firm-years with an equal dollar value of 
repurchases and dividends (this only occurs six times in my sample). 
 If the majority of a firm’s payout in a given year is made through dividends, 
PayComp will be a negative number. If the majority of the payout is made 
through repurchases, PayComp will be a positive number. If the entire payout is 
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made using dividends, PayComp will have a value of negative one. If stock 
repurchases are the only means of payout, PayComp will have a value of 
positive one. In my sample, the median and mean for PayComp are -0.51 and -
0.16 respectively. This indicates firms are more likely to use dividends over 
repurchases as their primary method of payout for the full sample period. 
 I use the following firm and year fixed effects model to estimate the 
influence that institutional owners have on a firm’s choice between the use of 
repurchases or dividends in determining their payout composition. 
 
(1-4)
 
ititititit ControlInstFirmYearPayComp εβ +•+++= −− 11
 
 
 This model is identical to models (1-1) and (1-2) except for the dependent 
variable. In this model, PayCompit represents the change in the payout 
composition measure for each firm in each year. As in the earlier models, the 
independent variables are measured as the change from year t – 2 to year t – 1. 
The dependent payout variable is measured as the change from year t - 1 to year 
t.  
 Table 1 - 9 reports on the influence that institutional ownership changes 
have on payout composition (PayComp) in the following year. The first 
regression uses only control variables as independent variables. The statistically 
significant coefficients indicate that payout composition tilts toward dividends as 
q, debt, retained earnings to total equity (a proxy for firm maturity), and return on 
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assets increase. Payouts tilt toward stock repurchases as market capitalization or 
revenue increases.  
 In the second regression, I add a variable (Inst) for institutional ownership. 
The result indicates a significantly positive relationship between institutional 
owners and an ensuing tendency to use repurchases as a greater part of the 
total payout composition. This tendency holds regardless of whether the majority 
of the firm’s payout was dividends or repurchases in the previous year. The third 
regression shows that institutional owners encourage an increase in repurchases 
as part of total payout composition in firms that favored dividends as a means of 
payout in the previous year. The fourth regression provides evidence that 
institutional owners also encourage repurchases over dividends in firms that 
favored repurchases as a means of payout in the previous year. 
 The substitution hypothesis is supported because institutional investors 
prefer repurchases over dividends and they use their influence to tilt payout 
composition towards repurchases. For robustness, I test this assertion using 
difference GMM and separately for the years 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005. The 
results which are shown and discussed in Appendix A support the substitution 
hypothesis and indicate that institutional investors encouraged an increase in 
repurchases as a part of total payout more intensely during the latter period.  
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Table 1 - 9: Institutional Ownership and Payout Composition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Firms All Firms 
Dividends > 
Repurchases 
at year t - 2 
Dividends ≤ 
Repurchases 
at year t - 2 
 
PayComp PayComp PayComp PayComp 
Inst 
 0.2701*** 0.2244*** 0.3739*** 
 
 (4.17) (2.69) (2.59) 
   q -0.0184** -0.0175** -0.0196** -0.0170 
 (2.29) (2.27) (2.06) (0.90) 
Debt -0.9427*** -0.9430*** -1.0601*** -0.6407*** 
 (10.17) (10.05) (9.18) (2.91) 
Turnover 0.0090 0.0071 -0.0426** 0.0266* 
 (0.71) (0.52) (2.47) (1.85) 
LifeCycle -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0027 -0.0001*** 
 (5.62) (5.48) (0.47) (26.31) 
MktCap 0.2515*** 0.2447*** 0.2601*** 0.2935*** 
 (8.81) (8.67) (7.41) (3.90) 
ROA -0.2041* -0.2163** 0.1117 -0.7461*** 
 (1.89) (2.01) (0.72) (3.13) 
Insider -0.1804 -0.1730 -0.1760 -0.1015 
 (1.35) (1.28) (1.01) (0.35) 
Insider2 0.0351 0.0355 0.1468 -0.2353 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.69) (0.63) 
Revenue 0.0731** 0.0685** 0.0324 0.1428** 
 (2.17) (2.05) (0.73) (2.40) 
Observations 16095 15933 9969 4282 
Number of Firms 3245 3217 1849 1690 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.34 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect regressions of 
changes (from year t - 1 to t) in a measure of payout composition 
(PayComp). PayComp is equal to -1 if payout is composed entirely of 
dividends and 1 if payout is composed entirely of stock repurchases. All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in that 
independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions (1) and (2) 
include all firms. Regression (3) includes only firms in which dividends 
exceeded repurchases in year t - 2 and regression (4) includes only firms 
in which repurchases exceeded dividends in year t - 2. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
 
 Institutions own almost 70% of U.S. public corporations. They have an 
informational advantage over other investors and have the capability to be better 
monitors of corporate management than individual investors. I test several 
theories about the relationship between institutional investors and payout policy 
in this paper. 
 The agency-based free cash flow theory (Jensen (1986)) suggests that 
firms with higher free cash flow and poor growth opportunities should have higher 
payouts (through higher dividends or stock repurchases). I find that higher 
institutional ownership leads to increases in total payouts, especially in firms with 
high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. 
 The adverse selection theory of Barclay and Smith (1988) and Brennan 
and Thakor (1990) predicts that institutional investors will encourage 
repurchases, especially in firms with high information asymmetry. This prediction 
holds as higher institutional ownership causes firms to increase repurchases and 
this relationship is stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry. I find no 
evidence that institutional investors encourage dividend increases.  
 Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that firms have been increasingly using 
funds that would have previously been used for dividends to make repurchases. 
My evidence that an increase in institutional ownership leads to an increase in 
the proportion of total payout going towards repurchases and consequently a 
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decrease in the proportion of payout going towards dividends provides support 
for their argument.  
 Institutional investors have a large and growing position as owners of 
public corporations. My results provide evidence that institutional investors are 
engaged in corporate governance and corporate payout policy. 
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2 Institutional Investors and R&D Investment 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In many firms, one of the most important financial decisions made by 
management executives is deciding how much the firm should invest in research 
and development (R&D). Generally, R&D investment is beneficial to 
shareholders. For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) provide 
evidence that the level and changes of R&D investment are positively associated 
with future returns. Still, the benefits of R&D investment may not be experienced 
by management or shareholders until after an extended period of time. Eberhart, 
Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) find that investors underreact to the benefits of 
R&D increases. They find evidence that firms experience abnormally positive 
stock returns for the 5-year period following an R&D increase. R&D investment is 
more likely to offer little or no return than comparable investments. Kothari, 
Laguerre, and Leone (2002) demonstrate that the future benefits from R&D are 
far more uncertain than benefits from many other uses of funds such as 
investments in property, plant, and equipment.  
The delayed and risky benefits of R&D can cause agency problems. 
Agency problems arise when managers act in their own interests at the expense 
of shareholders’ interests. Underinvestment in R&D may be advantageous to 
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management but not shareholders. Underinvestment may increase short-term 
earnings at the expense of long-term value because R&D investment is 
expensed immediately, but the payoff from R&D is rarely realized in the same 
accounting period as when the investment is made. Therefore, short-term 
earnings move inversely to R&D investment. 
Porter (1992) argues that because U.S. institutional managers are 
measured on their short-term performance that they focus on short-term returns 
in their investments. This drives them to focus on near-term indicators that 
provide limited information like current earnings when valuing investments. 
Management reacts to this pressure by decreasing investment in R&D. He 
contends that in comparison to European and Japanese companies which tend 
to have long-term shareholders with larger stakes, U.S. firms invest less in R&D 
and their investment projects are of shorter duration. He notes that both U.S. and 
foreign CEOs believe that U.S. companies have shorter investment horizons than 
their international competitors. 
There is evidence that managers sometimes intentionally invest at less 
than the optimal level. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) interview 
executives and find out that approximately 80% of them would reduce R&D to 
meet an earnings target. Bhojraj and Libby (2005) conduct an experiment in 
which 89 experienced financial managers choose between projects where a 
conflict exists between near-term earnings and total cash flow. In the experiment, 
managers favor projects that will maximize short-term earnings over projects 
which will maximize total cash flows when increased capital market pressure 
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resulting from a pending stock issuance is present. Management reduces R&D 
investment when the investment is likely to jeopardize reporting positive or 
increasing income in the near term (Baber, Fairfield and Haggard (1991)).  Harter 
and Harikumar (2004) find evidence that managers with greater earnings-based 
compensation tend to invest in projects with more immediate payoffs. Bhojraj et 
al. (2009) argue that dedicated earnings guiders engage in myopic R&D to beat 
analysts’ forecasts. Additionally, they find that managers know they are 
underinvesting as evidenced by increased insider selling following 
underinvestment in R&D. 
Institutional investors may help mitigate the potential problem of 
underinvestment in R&D or they may exacerbate it. Institutional investors pool 
large sums of money which they then invest in various investments including 
equity. Common institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, investment advisors, pension funds, hedge funds and university 
endowments. Institutions own nearly 70% of the shares of U.S. corporations.3 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional investors 
and R&D is mixed. Bange and De Bondt (1998) find in a study of 100 firms with 
large R&D budgets that management is less likely to manage earnings by cutting 
R&D if institutional ownership is higher. Conversely, in a study of 557 
manufacturing firms from 1985 – 1990, Samuel (2000) finds that institutional 
ownership has a negative effect on R&D expenditures. 
Still, institutional investors are generally believed to be more effective 
monitors of firm management than other investors. One reason for this is that the 
                                                 
3
 Bogle, John C. (2010) Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, Wall Street Journal (January 19). 
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relative cost of monitoring and influencing management is higher for non-
institutional shareholders than for institutions because costs are spread across 
fewer shares (Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks 
(2005) and Maug (1998)). 
I examine the effect that institutions have on R&D. First, I determine if 
institutional investors use their influence to persuade management to invest more 
in R&D. I then analyze the effect that firm stock liquidity, information asymmetry, 
free cash flow, and investment opportunities have on the relationship between 
institutional investors and R&D investment. 
Edmans (2009) creates a model which predicts that investors that hold a 
large proportion of a firm’s shares (blockholders) can encourage managers to 
invest for long-run growth at the expense of current earnings as long as a firm 
has sufficient stock liquidity. In the Edmans’ model, blockholders can encourage 
investment by influencing current stock prices to capture its long-term effect. The 
blockholders ability to exert this encouragement is positively related to the 
liquidity of the firm’s common stock. An interesting aspect of this model which is 
pertinent to my paper is that it demonstrates that investors can add value to a 
firm even if they do not directly intervene in a firm’s management.  
Edmans’ model could apply to institutional investors if institutional 
investors act in unison to affect investment policy. These actions do not even 
have to be coordinated as long as institutional investors tend to behave similarly. 
There is evidence that institutional investors sometimes act in near unison or 
“herd”. Sias (2004) provides evidence that institutions garner information from 
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each others’ trades which results in herding. Institutional investors herd into and 
out of the same industries (Choi and Sias (2009)). Mutual fund investors have 
been found to herd into small stocks (Wermers (1999)). Institutional investors 
herd on dividend signals (Rubin and Smith (2009)) and into stocks with positive 
return momentum (Nofsinger and Sias (1999)). 
Edmans conducts no empirical investigation of his theory in his paper. He 
does note that others have conducted empirical studies in which the findings are 
congruent with his theory. For example, Lee and O’Neill (2003) find that 
ownership concentration as proxied by blockholders that own more than 3% of a 
firm is positively related to R&D investment. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) 
provide evidence that an increase in certain categories of blockholders leads to 
higher investment in R&D. These studies do not investigate the effect that 
liquidity has on the relationship between blockholders and R&D. My research is 
novel in that I look specifically at the effect that liquidity has on the relationship 
between institutional investors and subsequent R&D investment. 
Edmans’ theory leads to the hypothesis that institutional investors will 
encourage R&D investment more in firms with greater stock liquidity. In this 
theory, the managers of firms with high institutional ownership invest more in 
R&D to raise firm value because they realize that institutional owners will be able 
to discern the true value of the investments. High firm stock liquidity is an 
important aspect of the theory because it allows institutional investors to divest 
their shares if they discern that managers are not investing properly and thus 
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offers the institutional investors an incentive to gather costly information required 
to monitor the firm effectively. 
Bhide (1993) offers a countervailing argument to Edmans’ theory about 
the relationship between blockholders and investment which I also expand to 
include institutional investors. Bhide does not provide extensive empirical 
evidence for his theory, instead relying on logic and specific examples. Bhide 
notes that U.S. regulations provide a wedge between investors and 
management, thus encouraging institutions to prefer dispersed arm’s-length 
holdings over long-term concentrated holdings. The regulations that encourage 
institutions to disperse their holdings among firms that they have an arm’s-length 
relationship include: pension and mutual funds are required to have diversified 
holdings, ERISA discourages pension managers from sitting on boards by 
holding them to a higher standard than other directors, insider-trading rules place 
special restrictions on investors that hold more than 10% of a company’s stock or 
serve on its board.  
These regulations increase the costs and reduce the benefits to 
institutional investors of monitoring management. Bhide asserts that higher 
liquidity allows large investors to divest their shares rather than expend 
resources to acquire the information necessary to monitor a firm effectively. He 
argues that since the large investors cannot sell their shares in firms with lower 
liquidity without accepting a significant discount, they prefer to expend effort to 
encourage management to invest more to enhance the value of their long-term 
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investment. Bhide’s argument provides the basis for my hypothesis that 
institutional investors will encourage R&D more in firms with low liquidity. 
The essential difference between the Edmans (2009) theory and the 
argument in Bhide (1993) can be summarized as follows. Bhide asserts that 
blockholders increase firm value by monitoring, and since monitoring and 
divestment are mutually exclusive, liquidity decreases the propensity of 
blockholders to monitor. Edmans argues that blockholder loyalty to a firm that 
makes sound investment decisions at the expense of weak earnings allows the 
blockholder to increase firm value. Loyalty and divestment are again mutually 
exclusive, but the loyalty in the face of weaker earnings provides a particularly 
strong indicator of value which is strengthened if the blockholder could have 
easily sold their shares. Paradoxically, the power of blockholder loyalty to add 
value depends on the ease of divestiture. 
If institutional investors affect R&D investment more in firms with high 
stock liquidity, a logical inference is that they influence management through the 
threat of divestment. On the other hand, if they affect R&D investment more in 
firms with low liquidity, then they are more likely to influence management using 
tactics such as proxy votes and shareholder proposals.  
In addition to the effect that liquidity has on the relationship between 
institutional investors and R&D investment, I also examine the effect that 
information asymmetry has on the relationship. Firms in which investors know 
relatively more about the firm’s future prospects are considered low information 
asymmetry firms. The importance of information asymmetry in R&D budgets to 
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investors is demonstrated by Aboody and Lev (2000) who find that R&D is a 
major contributor to insider gains and information asymmetry between insiders 
and investors. 
Information asymmetry is likely to be important to the relationship between 
institutional investors and R&D. Institutional investors have an informational 
advantage over other shareholders which varies with firm characteristics and 
information asymmetry (Bennet, Sias, and Starks (2003)). Institutions have an 
informational advantage in newly public firms (Field and Lowry (2009)) and 
seasoned equity offerings (Chemmanura, He, and Hu (2009)) which is largely the 
result of better analysis of publicly available information. If institutional investors 
encourage R&D investment more in low information asymmetry firms, it indicates 
that they are not more effective than other investors at monitoring firms which are 
difficult to monitor. Conversely, if institutional investors have a more positive 
effect on R&D investment in high information asymmetry firms, it shows that 
institutional investors are effective monitors of firms that are difficult for other 
investors to monitor.  
Finally, I test a hypothesis that institutional investors will encourage R&D 
more in firms that are less prone to overinvestment problems. This theory is 
derived from the work of Jensen (1986) which asserts that managers that put 
their interests above shareholders’ interests will be more prone to overinvest if 
their firm has high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. Jensen uses 
empirical evidence involving debt and acquisitions to support his theory. 
According to my hypothesis, institutional investors should encourage R&D 
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investment primarily in firms that have good investment opportunities and not 
simply because a firm has high free cash flow (available funds). If institutional 
investors don’t take investment opportunities into account when using their 
influence to convince management to increase R&D, then the relationship 
between institutional shareholders and R&D does not provide evidence of 
superior monitoring ability. 
My results indicate that institutional investors encourage higher R&D 
investment in general. I also find that institutional investors positively influence 
R&D investment primarily in firms with high liquidity. This provides empirical 
support for my hypothesis based on the Edmans (2009) model which predicts 
that shareholders that lack control rights can help control managerial investment 
myopia in firms with high liquidity by gathering information about the fundamental 
value of investment policies and impounding them into stock prices. 
I also provide evidence that institutional investors induce R&D investment 
more effectively in firms with high information asymmetry. Finally, I find that 
institutional investors encourage R&D investment more as investment 
opportunities rise, but not as free cash flow rises. Jensen (1986) provides 
evidence that managers tend to overinvest if they have free cash flow even if 
they do not have adequate investment opportunities. He finds that debt helps to 
control this tendency. My results provide evidence that institutional investors help 
control managerial overinvestment by only encouraging higher R&D investment 
in firms that have adequate investment opportunities. 
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I conclude that, holding other factors constant, higher institutional investor 
ownership leads to higher R&D investment. I also find that this relationship 
strengthens as firm stock liquidity increases, information asymmetry increases 
and investment opportunities increase. 
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.2.1   Literature Review 
 
Investment in R&D is essential to many firms and an important factor for 
success in many others. Generally, markets view increased R&D investment as a 
signal that a firm has good long-term opportunities. For example, Sundaram, 
John, and John (1996) find that the percentage change in R&D expenditures of 
firms announcing R&D increases has a positive impact on the stock price of the 
announcing firm. Yet, the stock market’s valuation of the intangible capital 
created by R&D varies widely by time period (Hall (1993)). Also, market reaction 
to R&D increase announcements is not uniform for all firms. Chan, Martin, and 
Kensinger (1990) find that markets react positively when high-technology firms 
announce increases and negatively when low-technology firms announce 
increases. This indicates that generally investors believe that high-technology 
firms do not invest enough in R&D and that low-technology firms invest too 
much. Despite the generally favorable view of R&D investment, economists have 
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developed theories that explain how firm management might be motivated to 
underinvest in R&D. 
Management can be susceptible to pressure to underinvest because of 
concerns about avoiding hostile takeovers and the time horizons of influential 
investors (Froot, Perold and Stein (1992) and Stein (1988)). Also, managers may 
underinvest because their concentration of wealth in a single firm makes them 
more risk averse (Stein (1988)) or to mislead the market about their firms’ worth 
by managing earnings (Stein (1989)). Tying management salary and bonuses to 
earnings can also create incentives to underinvest (Bange and De Bondt (1998)). 
On the other hand, managers may have an incentive to invest too much because 
increased corporate investment leads to increased firm size which often leads to 
increased power and compensation for managers (Jensen (1986)).  
Empirical studies have found evidence that managers sometimes 
underinvest (engage in managerial myopia) to improve short-term results at the 
expense of long-term firm value. Cheng, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2007) find 
that firms that frequently issue earnings guidance invest significantly less in R&D 
to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Holden and Lundstrum (2009) 
report that managers increase R&D and their firms become less likely to beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts after the introduction of long-term stock options 
(LEAPS) for their firm. They argue that the decline in the use of sub-optimal R&D 
investment to manage earnings is caused by the new-found ability of informed 
traders to profit from their long-term superior information through the use of 
LEAPS.  
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If management’s income is tied to short-term earnings or if a manager will 
not be around by the time a long-term investment begins to pay off, management 
may have an incentive to manage earnings through underinvestment. CEO 
turnover rates are increasing and are becoming more strongly related to firm 
stock performance (Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2005) and Kaplan and Minton 
(2006)). This trend may be increasing the likelihood that managers’ will invest 
myopically. It has been demonstrated that late career-stage CEOs manage 
earnings while early career stage CEOs do not (Demers and Wang (2010)) and 
CEOs spend less on R&D near the end of their careers (Dechow and Sloan 
(1991)). Peng and Roell (2008) find that option-based pay increases the 
probability of securities class action litigation and earnings manipulation. This 
result suggests that option-based compensation gives executives an incentive to 
focus on short-term stock prices. 
Although there is substantial evidence that management of some firms 
systematically underinvest, there is also considerable evidence that managers do 
not methodically underinvest. Cazier (2009) follows CEOs throughout time and 
finds no evidence that they reduce spending on R&D as they near retirement, 
although he does find that older CEOs spend less on R&D in general. On the 
other hand, in a study on data from 1970 to 1989, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
find that R&D spending tends to be the largest during a CEO’s final years in 
office. They offer three explanations for this somewhat puzzling result: CEOs 
may believe R&D offers a more immediate payoff than other projects, R&D is 
formulated by a group of executives that are likely to have different retirement 
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dates than the CEO, and the potential impact on the CEO’s wealth from R&D is 
too small to justify manipulative behavior. Their results could also be explained 
by the finding in Cheng (2004) that board compensation committees recognize 
the potential for CEOs nearing retirement to underinvest in R&D and mitigate 
underinvestment through compensation incentives.  
The use of long-term compensation incentives is increasing. Stock-based 
pay for executives rose in both new and old economy firms from 1992 - 2001 
(Murphy (2003)). Stock-based pay may alleviate underinvestment problems. 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to 
stock volatility results in riskier policy choices, including relatively more 
investment in R&D. Kang, Kumar, and Lee (2006) also provide evidence that 
long-term investment is positively related to equity-based incentive 
compensation.  
R&D investment can also be impacted by the monitoring influence of 
institutional shareholders. Many studies have found evidence that institutional 
investors influence R&D investment. Yet, these studies have offered mixed 
results as to the effectiveness of institutional investors as monitors of R&D 
investment. 
For example, Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009) argue that 
institutional investors have a positive impact on R&D and its productivity by 
reducing the career risk faced by CEOs who invest in risky R&D projects. They 
find that CEOs are less likely to be fired after profit downturns resulting from such 
projects if institutional ownership is higher. Huang and Shiu (2009) assert that 
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foreign institutional investor ownership in Taiwanese firms is positively 
associated with R&D investment and subsequent firm performance indicating 
that the institutional investors have an informational advantage over domestic 
investors. Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout (1996) find that abnormal returns 
from announced increases in R&D expenditures were positively related to 
institutional ownership indicating that the market views institutional owners as 
effective monitors of R&D. David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) observe that 
institutional ownership does not lead to increased R&D unless the institutional 
owners attempt to influence R&D by resorting to activist actions such as public 
announcements, shareholder proposals, proxy contests or direct negotiations 
with managers. Bushee (1998) finds that greater institutional ownership 
decreases the likelihood that R&D will be cut following a poor earnings 
performance. Wahal and McConnell (2000) find no support for the assertion that 
that high transient institutional ownership leads to lower R&D. In a study of 
technology and healthcare firms, Le, Walters, and Kroll (2006) find that transient 
and long-term institutional investors actively monitor and influence R&D 
spending.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that institutional investors are not 
effective monitors of R&D investment. Chung, Wright, and Kedia (2003) find that 
institutional holdings had no effect on the market valuation of R&D investments. 
Jones and Danbolt (2003) argue that U.K. institutional investors react to short-
term performance measurement pressures by taking a myopic view of R&D 
expenditures. They find that firms with higher institutional ownership have a less 
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positive stock price response to R&D increase announcements. You, Chen, and 
Holder (2008) demonstrate that institutional investors have no effect on R&D 
levels in American pharmaceutical firms. They also find that institutional 
ownership leads to less efficient R&D in American and Korean pharmaceutical 
firms indicating support for a myopic influence on management by institutional 
investors. Using a sample which only includes firms that experience an earnings 
decline, Bushee (1998) argues that managers reduce R&D to boost earnings in 
firms with high levels of transient institutional ownership 
It may be difficult for even large investors to monitor R&D. Zeckhauser 
and Pound (1990) hypothesize that firms in industries with high R&D investment 
to sales levels have higher information asymmetry and are thus more difficult to 
monitor. Using blockholders’ effect on earnings growth as a measure of 
monitoring ability, they found that investors that own over 15% of a company are 
effective monitors in firms that are in industries with low R&D levels (and thus low 
information asymmetry) but not in industries with high R&D levels.  
 
2.2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and others have theorized that large investors are 
important monitors of firm management. Institutional investors can influence 
management through proxy votes, shareholder proposals, publicity generation or 
the threat of “voting with their feet” thus depressing stock share price as the 
shares are sold. The influence of institutions is demonstrated by the fact that their 
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shareholder proposals get more votes and a more positive stock price reaction 
(Gillan and Starks (2000)). Ryan and Wiggins (2002) find that institutional owners 
influence R&D directly by monitoring management and indirectly by influencing 
compensation policy. The influence institutional investors can wield is reflected in 
the view of CFOs that institutional investors are the most important marginal 
investors (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). This influence gains empirical 
evidence from the finding of Gillan and Starks (2007) that institutional investors 
can influence management through the threat of divesting their shares. CFO 
interviews point out other reasons that institutional investors are important: they 
can lower stock price by herding out of a stock after an earnings miss or they can 
provide easier access to capital leading to a lower future cost of capital if they are 
pleased with firm management (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). 
If institutional investors herd, then they may have an influence that is 
similar to that of large shareholders. Evidence has been found that institutions or 
large shareholders influence corporate governance. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) 
find that monitoring by institutions with concentrated long-term holdings improves 
the performance of firms involved in mergers. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) 
find that large shareholders influence corporate investment, financial and 
executive compensation policies. 
Wahal and McConnell (2000) and Lee and O’Neill (2003) find a positive 
relationship between institutional investors and R&D investment. They do not 
establish that institutional investors use their influence to persuade management 
to increase R&D investment. Given that the market generally rewards increased 
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R&D investment and that institutional investors have been shown to effectively 
monitor management, I hypothesize that the influence of institutional investors 
will lead to higher R&D investment. 
 
H1: Institutional investors will encourage higher R&D investment, after 
controlling for firm characteristics. 
 
In a model proposed by Edmans (2009), investors with large holdings in a 
firm have strong incentives to monitor the firm. They use private information that 
they gather as a result of these incentives to make trading decisions. Therefore, 
they make trading decisions based on the fundamental value of the firm rather 
than current earnings. This encourages management to invest for the long-term 
rather than for short-term profits. Management can thus avoid a depressed stock 
share price that results from large investors divesting their shares. In Edmans’ 
model, the ability of blockholders to influence management is enhanced by high 
firm stock liquidity. Although Edmans’ model is built upon the actions of 
blockholders, his model demonstrates how shareholders can influence 
management even if they do not have control rights. Therefore, institutional 
investors that demonstrate herding behavior because of similar motives can 
effectively act as blockholders.  Therefore, I test an extension of the Edmans’ 
model by investigating if the ability of institutional investors to encourage higher 
R&D investment is enhanced by high stock liquidity.  
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According to Bhide (1993), greater liquidity allows large investors to divest 
their shares rather than expend costly resources to monitor management and 
encourage investment. An implication I have derived from this assertion is that 
high stock liquidity increases the incentives for institutional investors to divest 
their shares rather than expend costly effort encouraging higher R&D investment. 
Although Edmans presented evidence of empirical research by others that 
is consistent with his model and Bhide provided logic and specific incidents that 
supported his model, the contradictory predictions that I derive from these two 
papers has not been directly tested to my knowledge. My application of the 
Edmans’ model to institutional investors leads to hypothesis H2A and the 
predictions that I derive from Bhide’s theory leads to hypothesis H2B. 
 
H2A: Institutional investors will encourage R&D investment more as firm 
stock liquidity increases. 
 
H2B: Institutional investors will encourage R&D investment more as firm 
stock liquidity decreases. 
 
Previous research has provided evidence that institutional investors’ 
informational advantage over other investors gives them the ability to be more 
effective monitors. The superior monitoring ability of institutional investors may 
vary with the level of firm information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
shareholders. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) provide evidence that monitoring by 
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another group of informed investors, shareholders that own more than 15% of a 
firm, is only effective in firms with low information asymmetry. This indicates that 
it is possible that institutional shareholders will not be able to effectively monitor 
R&D investment in firms with high information asymmetry. On the other hand, 
institutional investors may be able to more effectively exploit their informational 
advantage in firms with high information asymmetry leading to more effective 
monitoring of R&D in such firms. These two conflicting possibilities are the basis 
for my next two hypotheses.  
 
H3A: Institutional investors will encourage R&D investment more as 
information asymmetry decreases. 
 
H3B: Institutional investors will encourage R&D investment more as 
information asymmetry increases. 
 
 Agency costs are incurred by investors when a firm’s management uses 
its superior knowledge of the firm’s business activities to make decisions that 
benefit management at the expense of shareholders. Agency-based free cash 
flow theory (Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)) suggests that firms with 
higher free cash flow and poor growth opportunities have higher discretionary 
funds that can be misused by management. 
 If institutional investors are better monitors than other investors, 
agency-based theory implies that institutional investors will encourage R&D 
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investment more in firms with good investment opportunities, but they will not 
encourage R&D investment more in firms with high free cash flow (unless the 
high free cash flow is accompanied by good investment opportunities). This leads 
to my final hypothesis.  
 
H4: Institutional investors will encourage R&D investment more as 
investment opportunities increase. In the absence of increased investment 
opportunities, institutional investors will not encourage R&D investment 
more as free cash flow increases. 
 
 An endogenous relationship probably exists between institutional investors 
and investment policy so simply showing a relationship between institutional 
investors and R&D investment will not provide sufficient evidence to support any 
of the investment policy theories. Causality is also important. In all my 
hypotheses, a change in institutional ownership leads to a change in R&D 
investment policy. 
 
2.3 Data, Methods and Summary Statistics 
 
2.3.1   Data and Methods 
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I compile yearly ownership data for institutional and insider ownership 
from CDA / Spectrum Compact Disclosure from 1990 to 2005. Utilities and 
financial firms are excluded because they are highly regulated. The ownership 
data and Compustat data are then merged. The final sample includes 10,668 
firms and 79,890 firm-years. If a firm is missing data or is not present in the 
sample for enough firm-years to perform certain analysis, it is not used. 
Following Bushee (1998), I use R&D investment per share (adjusting for 
stock splits) as my primary measure of R&D investment.  I also use R&D to 
assets as a measure of R&D investment for some of my robustness checks. 
Many others have used R&D to sales as a measure of R&D investment, but my 
sample includes numerous small firms with negligible sales. Therefore, results 
using R&D to sales as a dependent variable tend to be dominated by firms with 
the lowest sales figures. R&D investment per share is an effective measure to 
use in discerning if a firm increased or decreased R&D investment, but it does 
not provide a proper scale for use in linear regressions. Therefore, I use logit 
regressions in my analysis using a binary dependent variable which indicates 
either R&D increases or decreases. As in previous studies, missing values of 
R&D expenditures are assumed to be zero (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006) and Cheng (2008)).   
Since a variety of factors can jointly affect institutional ownership and 
investment levels, thus inducing a spurious correlation, several control variables 
must be used in my regressions. I start with the same control variables used by 
Wahal and McConnell (2000) in their study of the effects of institutional investors 
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on R&D and capital investment with one exception; I substitute q for the book-to-
market ratio. Following Dlugosz et al. (2006), I calculate the variable q as the 
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets where market 
value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value 
of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  
I use total debt to total assets because firms may forego R&D investment 
if funds are required to service debt. I include earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) scaled by total assets because the availability of internally generated firms 
may have an impact on R&D investment decisions. I use insider percentage 
ownership and insider percentage ownership squared because insider owners 
are widely documented to have an effect on corporate policies and firm value 
(e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)). I also use log of sales as an 
independent control variable to control for firm size.  
I add some control variables that were not used by Wahal and McConnell 
(2000). Capital expenditures scaled by assets is used to control for funds 
required for this use that are not available for R&D investment and for transition 
into a more mature firm life-cycle which requires a different investment mix 
(Bushee (1998)). I also use a proxy for firm life-cycle, retained earnings to the 
book value of total equity (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006)), because R&D 
investment may vary as a firm becomes more mature.  I use the log of market 
capitalization of equity because smaller firms are more likely to suffer cash flow 
constraints that may limit cash available for R&D investment (Jalilvand and Harris 
(1984)). I use free cash flow scaled by total assets because firms with negative 
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free cash flow may be forced to curtail R&D expenditures to preserve funds 
(Bushee (1998)). Free cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation and 
amortization minus capital expenditures.  
In some of my analysis, I determine if liquidity has an effect on the 
relationship between institutional investors and R&D investment. Therefore, I use 
firm stock turnover as a proxy for liquidity as a control variable. Firm stock 
turnover is defined as the number of common shares traded in a year divided by 
common shares outstanding. The detailed definitions of all variables are shown 
in Table 2 - 1. 
The relationship between institutional investors and R&D investment is 
almost certainly endogenous and my hypotheses are contingent on institutional 
investors influencing R&D. Therefore, I must use a regression methodology 
which accounts for endogeneity and establishes causality.4  
I run regressions on changes in dependent variables from year t – 1 to t 
on changes in independent variables from t – 2 to t – 1 to establish causality. I 
use firm fixed effect regressions to control for all stable characteristics of a firm 
(including industry), whether measured or not. I use yearly dummy variables to 
control for time-varying omitted characteristics. Firm and year fixed effects 
alleviate endogeneity problems. Firm fixed effects regressions with yearly dummy 
variables effectively give a separate intercept to each year. Intercepts in fixed 
effects regressions are calculated as an average value of the unobserved fixed 
effects for each firm. This intercept and the yearly intercept values are not 
                                                 
4
 I attempted two-stage least squares’ (instrumental variables) regressions but was unable to 
come up with instrumental variables which were statistically and conceptually sound. 
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relevant to my analysis. Therefore, the intercept term and yearly dummy 
coefficients are not reported in my regression results. 
Although I use firm and year fixed effects and control variables in the 
change regressions to control for endogeneity, I also use the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) difference Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM) 
methodology for robustness. Difference GMM is ideal for use in panel data with 
limited time periods, a large number of firms, independent variables that are not 
strictly exogenous, and firm fixed effects. The difference GMM method I use is 
explained in-depth in Appendix C. 
 
2.3.2 Summary Statistics and Data Correlations 
 
 Table 2 - 2 displays sample summary statistics. Panel A includes all firms 
and panel B includes only firm-years in which the firm made R&D investments. 
Statistics are shown for two time periods, 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005, and for 
the total sample. Means are shown and medians are shown in parentheses 
below. 
 There are patterns in the data for all firms and in firms with R&D 
investment. The percentage ownership of institutional investors increases over 
time. Institutional ownership for all firms and for firms that invest in R&D is quite 
similar. R&D expenses to sales increases from the first period to the next. 
Notably, the average R&D to sales ratio is much higher than the median R&D to 
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sales ratio in all groups. This is an indication of skewness.  The average is 
dominated by a few firms with very large R&D to sales ratios.  
 Firm size and q increase from the first time period to the next as well. 
Retained earnings to total equity is a proxy for firm life-cycle in which a more 
positive number indicates a more mature firm. Overall, firms included in the 
sample are less mature in the later years. This is probably because of the large 
number of firms which came public during the run-up to the internet bubble. 
Compared to the entire sample, firms with R&D expenses are less mature 
(earlier in their life-cycle) and have higher liquidity.  
Table 2 - 3 displays correlations for selected firm variables. Correlations 
that are significant at the 5% level are marked with an asterisk. R&D to sales 
(R&D) is significantly negatively correlated with institutional ownership (Inst). 
Institutional ownership (Inst) is significantly negatively correlated with Tobin’s q 
(q) and significantly positively correlated with free cash flow to assets (FCF). 
Institutional ownership is significantly positively related to Market value of 
common stock (MktCap). 
Free cash flow to assets is significantly negatively related to Tobin’s q. 
Retained equity to total equity (LifeCycle) and firm stock turnover (Liquidity) are 
not significantly correlated with any of the other variables. 
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Table 2 - 1: Variable Definitions - R&D 
Variable Description Definition 
Panel A: Summary Statistics and Correlation Table Variables 
N Number of Firms The number of firms.  
Inst Institutional Ownership 
The fraction of shares owned by institutional 
investors. 
R&D R&D Expenses Research and development expenses divided by previous year’s sales 
q Investment Opportunities Market value of assets to the book value of assets 
MktCap Market Capitalization The dollar market value of common stock in 
millions.  
LifeCycle Firm Life-cycle The ratio of retained earnings to total equity.  
Liquidity Stock Turnover Number of common shares traded in a year divided by common shares outstanding 
FCF Free Cash Flow Net income plus depreciation and amortization 
minus capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
Panel B: Regression Dependent Variables  
(Measured as changes in values from year t – 1 to t.) 
R&D_Incr R&D Increase 
Binary variable equal to one if there is an increase 
in R&D expenses per split-adjusted common share 
and zero otherwise.  
R&D_Decr R&D Decrease 
Binary variable equal to one if there is a decrease 
in R&D expenses per split-adjusted common share 
and zero otherwise.  
R&D_Assets R&D to Assets R&D expenses divided by previous year’s total 
assets 
Panel C: Regression Independent Variables 
 (Measured as changes in values from year t – 2 to t - 1.) 
Inst Institutional Ownership 
The fraction of shares owned by institutional 
investors. 
q Investment Opportunities Market value of assets to the book value of assets 
Debt Debt Ratio Debt to assets.  
ROA Return on Assets Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets.  
Insider Insider Ownership The fraction of shares owned by insiders.  
Insider2 Insider Ownership Squared The squared value of Insider.  
MktCap Market Capitalization The dollar market value of common stock in 
millions.  
CapEx Capital Expenditures Capital expenditures to total assets 
FCF Free Cash Flow Net income plus depreciation and amortization 
minus capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
Liquidity Stock Turnover Number of common shares traded in a year divided by common shares outstanding 
LifeCycle Firm Life-cycle The ratio of retained earnings to total equity.  
Revenue Revenue The logarithm of firm revenue. 
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Table 2 - 2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: All Firms 
Years N Inst R&D q MktCap LifeCycle Liquidity FCF 
1990 - 1997 37492 28.9% 1.155 2.81 2106 -0.69 4.46 -0.16 
  (23.6%) (0.000) (1.85) (163) (0.29) (0.64) (0.01) 
1998 - 2005 42398 33.3% 1.656 4.68 4891 -0.53 4.80 -0.39 
  (25.8%) (0.003) (1.86) (350) (0.18) (0.86) (0.01) 
Total 79890 31.3% 1.433 3.82 3603 -0.61 4.64 -0.28 
  (24.6%) (0.000) (1.85) (239) (0.24) (0.74) (0.01) 
Panel B: Firms with R&D Expenses 
1990 - 1997 17240 29.8% 2.479 3.04 3007 -1.75 6.88 -0.11 
  (24.1%) (0.059) (2.12) (157) (0.26) (0.75) (0.02) 
1998 - 2005 21751 33.3% 3.197 3.97 6360 -0.48 6.30 -0.33 
  (25.8%) (0.096) (2.23) (317) (0.01) (1.01) (-0.00) 
Total 38991 31.8% 2.896 3.56 4894 -1.04 6.55 -0.24 
  (24.9%) (0.078) (2.18) (226) (0.14) (0.88) (0.01) 
Means are shown on the first row and medians are shown in parentheses on the second row. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - 3: Correlations 
            R&D Inst q MktCap LifeCycle Liquidity 
Inst -0.0133*      
q 0.0028 -0.0135*     
MktCap -0.0049 0.0865* -0.0019    
LifeCycle -0.0010 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009   
Liquidity -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002  
FCF -0.0032 0.0232* -0.4194* 0.0023 -0.0008 0.0000 
* indicates two-tailed significance at 5%. 
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2.4 The Effect of Institutional Owners on R&D Investment  
 
2.4.1 Does Increased R&D Lead to Lower Earnings? 
 
It is generally assumed that corporate investment in R&D will have a long-
term payoff in the aggregate. Otherwise, there would be no reason to make such 
investments. An essential component of arguing that a reduction in such 
investment is myopic in nature is an existence of a negative relationship between 
investment and short-term reported earnings. This link seems clear because, as 
noted in Wahal and McConnell (2000), accounting methods decrease short-term 
earnings as R&D spending is expensed immediately, but an increase in earnings 
from these investments may not occur for years. Nevertheless, I use a method 
similar to the one they used to show a negative relationship between investment 
spending and short-term earnings for my sample. 
 I run firm fixed effect regressions using current year net income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets from the previous year as the 
dependent variable. The only independent variable is current R&D expenditures 
divided by the previous year’s sales. The results for these regressions are not 
shown in any table, but are described here.  
 I run the regression for the entire sample, for years 1990 – 1997, and for 
years 1998 – 2005. The coefficient is significantly negative in all three 
regressions with t-statistics of 8.58, 3.80 and 5.67 respectively. I also run the 
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regression on a year-by-year basis. The coefficients for the R&D variables on a 
year-by-year basis are all negative with a minimum t-statistic of 2.10.  The value 
for R2 is over 0.05 for all but two of the years. The evidence indicates that R&D 
expenditures reduce current reported earnings. 
 
2.4.2 Do Institutional Owners Influence R&D Investment? 
 
 I investigate the influence that institutional investors have on R&D 
investment by estimating the following firm and year fixed effects logit model.  
 
 (2-1) ititititit ControlInstFirmYearRDChg εβ +•+++= −− 11  
 
 The dependent variable RDChgit is a binary variable set to either zero or 
one. In most of my analysis, it is set to one if there is an increase in R&D 
investment per share and to zero if not. In a robustness check, it is set to one if 
there is a decrease in R&D investment per share and to zero if not. The 
independent variable of interest (Instit-1) represents the effect of changes in 
institutional ownership percentage on changes in R&D investment in the 
following year.  
 In model (2-1), Yeart represents year fixed effects, Firmi represents firm 
fixed effects, Controlit-1 represents a vector of time-varying firm level control 
variables (q, debt, ROA, insider ownership, insider ownership squared, log of 
market capitalization, capital expenditures to assets, free cash flow to assets, 
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stock turnover, retained equity to total equity, and log of revenue), and εit is the 
error term. 
 The dependent variable is calculated on the change in R&D from year t - 1 
to year t. The independent variables are measured as the change from year t – 2 
to year t – 1. The logit model drops firms from the regression that never have a 
change in the dependent variable. This means that when the dependent variable 
is an R&D increase binary variable, firms that increase their R&D investment in 
every year of the sample and firms that don’t increase their R&D investment in 
any year of the sample are dropped from the regression. I consider this an 
advantage to the model since only firms that change R&D policy are included in 
regression samples. 
 Table 2 - 4 reports results on the influence that changes in institutional 
ownership have on R&D investment per share increases in the subsequent year. 
The first regression uses only control variables as independent variables. 
Increases in R&D investment occurs more often as return on assets, market 
capitalization, free cash flow, and revenue increase and as q decreases,.  
 The second regression shows that an increase in institutional ownership 
leads to an increased probability that a firm will increase R&D investment in the 
ensuing year. This result could simply be a byproduct of a tendency of 
institutional investors to invest more in firms that regularly increase their 
investment in R&D. To control for this possibility, the third regression is run only 
on firms that did not increase R&D investment in year t – 2. The third regression 
indicates that an increase in institutional investor ownership has a positive effect 
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on the probability of an R&D investment increase even if the firm did not increase 
R&D investment in the year preceding the increase in institutional ownership.  
The fourth regression is run only on firms that increased R&D investment in year 
t – 2. The evidence indicates that institutional investors encourage R&D 
investment increases in this group as well.  
 The results for one of the control variables appear to be counterintuitive 
and deserve some discussion. It seems that R&D investment should go up as q 
increases. But, q is largely a ratio of market capitalization to book value of 
assets. Therefore, the counterintuitive coefficient for q could be a function of the 
effect of q on R&D investment levels being overwhelmed by the effect of other 
control variables, particularly market capitalization. I tested this possibility by 
substituting total assets for market capitalization as a proxy for firm size. After the 
substitution, the results were very similar to the ones shown in Table 2 - 4 except 
that the coefficient for q switched from significantly negative to significantly 
positive indicating that the strength of the market capitalization control variable 
was causing the counterintuitive result for the q control variable. 
 Institutional investors use their influence to persuade management to raise 
R&D investment. This holds true whether or not the firm increased their R&D 
investment in the previous year. Results for robustness checks using data from 
the years 1990-1997 and 1998-2005 separately confirm that institutional 
investors encourage higher R&D.  Another robustness check confirms that 
institutional investors discourage R&D cuts as well. A final robustness test using 
R&D to assets as the dependent variable and the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
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difference Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM) methodology to 
further control for endogeneity also confirms that institutional ownership 
increases are positively related to subsequent R&D.  Robustness results are 
shown and discussed in Appendix B. 
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Table 2 - 4: Institutional Ownership and R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Firms All Firms 
No R&D 
Incr. in year 
t - 2 
R&D Incr. in  
year t - 2 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 
 0.8576*** 0.8496*** 0.6722*** 
 
 (5.54) (3.13) (2.95) 
q -0.0406*** -0.0374*** -0.0366*** -0.0470*** 
 (4.97) (4.64) (2.94) (3.23) 
Debt -0.0920 -0.0807 0.1262 -0.5816** 
 (1.18) (1.04) (1.10) (2.39) 
ROA 0.1942* 0.1969* -0.0509 0.1756 
 (1.84) (1.85) (0.40) (0.75) 
Insider -0.1552 -0.1622 -0.6080 0.8499 
 (0.46) (0.48) (1.12) (1.57) 
Insider2 0.3269 0.3213 1.0153 -0.7765 
 (0.74) (0.72) (1.39) (1.10) 
MktCap 0.6717*** 0.6324*** 0.6192*** 0.6859*** 
 (15.48) (14.48) (9.16) (9.06) 
CapEx 0.2181 0.1729 0.1679 -0.0410 
 (0.96) (0.76) (0.47) (0.12) 
FCF 0.1560** 0.1637*** 0.1714* 0.3113** 
 (2.54) (2.59) (1.89) (2.27) 
Liquidity -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0188 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.18) (0.98) 
LifeCycle 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0025** 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.91) (2.21) 
Revenue 0.0912** 0.0849** 0.0272 0.2382*** 
 (2.47) (2.30) (0.53) (3.37) 
Observations 18434 18215 6627 8630 
Number of Firms 2769 2757 1607 1814 
Pseudo R-sqr. 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit regressions of 
increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D expenditures (R&D_Incr). All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions (1) and (2) include all firms. 
Regression (3) includes only firms that had no R&D increase in year t - 2 and 
regression (4) includes only firms that had an R&D increase in year t - 2. 
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2.4.3  Is Stock Liquidity a Factor? 
   
 According to my hypothesis derived from a model proposed by Edmans 
(2009), institutional investors positive influence on subsequent R&D investment 
should primarily be concentrated in firms with high stock liquidity. According to 
my interpretation of Bhide (1993), this relationship should be stronger in firms 
with low stock liquidity. I test these predictions using firm stock turnover as a 
proxy for firm stock liquidity.  I sort the sample of firms each year into liquidity 
deciles. I assign each firm-year to one of three groups. Firms in the bottom three 
deciles have low liquidity, those in the next four deciles have medium liquidity, 
and those in the highest three deciles have high liquidity.  
 The median R&D to sales ratio for firm-years in which the firm made an 
R&D investment in the low, medium, and high liquidity groups are 3.48%, 5.90% 
and 14.76% respectively. The percentage of firm-years in which the firm made an 
R&D investment in the low, medium, and high liquidity groups are 41%, 49% and 
59% respectively. Thus, firms with greater liquidity are prone to invest more and 
more often in R&D. 
 I run regressions using the firm and year fixed effects logit model (2-1) that 
shows the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on R&D investment 
per share increases (R&D_Incr) in the subsequent year. Regressions are run on 
the low liquidity, medium liquidity, and high liquidity groups separately based on 
which group a firm is in during year t – 1. Results are shown in 
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Table 2 - 5. 
 The first and second regression, which includes only firms in the low and 
medium liquidity groups respectively, shows that institutional investors have no 
significant effect on R&D increases in these two groups. On the other hand, the 
third regression shows that institutional investors encourage R&D increases in 
firms with high liquidity. These results are consistent with the hypothesis derived 
from the Edmans’ (2009) model which predicts that institutional investors will 
encourage R&D in firms with high stock liquidity. A robustness check using 
difference GMM supports this finding. It is discussed in Appendix B. The 
hypothesis derived from the arguments of Bhide (1993) is not supported.  
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Table 2 - 5: Institutional Ownership, R&D, and Stock Liquidity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Low Liquidity Medium Liquidity High Liquidity 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst -0.2674 0.2409 1.1890*** 
 (0.47) (0.72) (5.45) 
q -0.0656** -0.0267 -0.0315*** 
 (2.02) (1.46) (2.60) 
Debt 0.0463 -0.4591* -0.8957*** 
 (0.68) (1.76) (3.13) 
ROA -0.1388 0.2399 0.4805** 
 (0.51) (1.17) (2.24) 
Insider -0.3025 -0.4556 0.0283 
 (0.43) (0.74) (0.04) 
Insider2 0.2158 0.9333 -0.0420 
 (0.24) (1.10) (0.05) 
MktCap 0.5437*** 0.6311*** 0.6303*** 
 (4.31) (6.77) (9.05) 
CapEx 0.5539 1.0343** -0.3959 
 (0.79) (2.00) (1.18) 
FCF 0.5882*** 0.1642 -0.0129 
 (2.67) (1.52) (0.09) 
Liquidity 0.1066 -0.0779 -0.0001 
 (0.48) (1.50) (0.13) 
LifeCycle -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.16) (0.38) (0.43) 
Revenue 0.1478 0.0440 0.0425 
 (1.45) (0.59) (0.68) 
Observations 3224 6166 5521 
Number of Firms 741 1303 1127 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.09 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D 
expenditures (R&D_Incr). All independent variable values are 
calculated as changes in that independent variable from year t - 
2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) 
include only Low, Medium and High Liquidity firms, respectively. 
The Low, Medium and High Liquidity groups include the lowest 
three, middle four, and highest three Liquidity deciles from year 
t - 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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2.4.4  Is Information Asymmetry a Factor? 
 
 Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) find that large shareholders (holding over 
15% of a firm) are not effective monitors of firms with high information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. Their result raises the possibility that 
institutional investors will be ineffective monitors of firms with high information 
asymmetry. If this is true, institutional investors will not encourage increased 
R&D investment in firms with high information asymmetry because they will not 
be able to ascertain the true value of R&D spending in such firms. A 
countervailing possibility is that institutional investors will encourage R&D 
investment more in firms that have high information asymmetry because their 
superior monitoring ability will allow them to discern the value of R&D 
investments more readily in such firms.  
 I test these contradictory hypotheses using retained earnings to total 
equity (LifeCycle) as a proxy for information asymmetry. DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Stulz (2006) use this measure as a proxy for firm life-cycle. They assert that 
this is a valid proxy for firm information asymmetry. This assertion appears 
logical because the more mature a firm is the more information an investor will 
have about the firm to judge its prospects, all else being equal. 
 I sort the sample of firms each year into information asymmetry deciles. I 
assign each firm-year to one of three groups. Firms in the bottom three deciles 
(Early LifeCycle) have high information asymmetry, those in the next four deciles 
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(Middle LifeCycle) have moderate information asymmetry, and those in the 
highest three deciles (Late LifeCycle) have low information asymmetry.  
 The median R&D to sales ratio for firm-years in which a firm made an 
R&D investment in the early, middle, and late LifeCycle groups are 19.26%, 
6.95% and 3.40% respectively. The percentage of firm-years in which the firm 
made an R&D investment in the early, middle, and late LifeCycle groups are 
60%, 44% and 47% respectively. Thus, firms earlier in their LifeCycle (with 
higher information asymmetry) are prone to invest more and more often in R&D.  
 I run regressions using the firm and year fixed effects model (2-1) that 
shows the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on R&D investment 
increases in the subsequent year. Regressions are run on the early, middle, and 
late LifeCycle groups separately based on which group a firm is in during year t – 
1. The results are shown in Table 2 - 6.  
 The first two regressions show that institutional investors encourage R&D 
increases in firms with high and moderate information asymmetry. The third 
regression shows that institutional investors do not encourage R&D investment 
increases at a significant level in firms with low information asymmetry.  The 
pattern indicates that institutional investors encourage R&D investment more in 
firms with higher information asymmetry. This is consistent with the assertion that 
the superior monitoring ability of institutional investors allows them to discern the 
value of R&D investments more readily than other investors, even in firms with 
high information asymmetry. 
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 A robustness check using the difference GMM methodology confirms this 
result. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) used R&D levels as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. Therefore, I also use R&D to assets as a proxy for information 
asymmetry to add robustness to my results. This robustness check also confirms 
that institutional investors encourage increased R&D in firms with high 
information asymmetry. Robustness checks are displayed and discussed in 
Appendix B. 
 93
 
Table 2 - 6: Institutional Ownership, R&D, and Firm Life-cycle 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Early 
LifeCycle 
Middle 
LifeCycle 
Late 
LifeCycle 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 0.6381** 0.7078*** 0.4883 
 (2.09) (2.80) (1.43) 
q -0.0458*** -0.0334* -0.0017 
 (3.35) (1.83) (0.09) 
Debt -0.3202 -1.0502*** 0.0176 
 (1.08) (2.89) (0.26) 
ROA 0.5454*** 0.6316 -0.1661 
 (3.55) (1.37) (0.97) 
Insider 0.3653 -0.0498 -0.6912 
 (0.62) (0.08) (0.99) 
Insider2 -0.1883 0.2393 1.0595 
 (0.23) (0.30) (1.18) 
MktCap 0.5805*** 0.6403*** 0.5050*** 
 (8.46) (6.70) (4.64) 
CapEx 0.6182 0.1985 -0.6114 
 (1.58) (0.50) (0.91) 
FCF 0.0582 0.6432** 0.2967* 
 (0.73) (1.97) (1.91) 
Liquidity 0.0847*** 0.0017 -0.0929** 
 (3.84) (0.09) (2.03) 
LifeCycle 0.0002 -0.0460 -0.0002 
 (1.12) (1.13) (0.52) 
Revenue -0.0130 0.1008 0.3387** 
 (0.30) (0.85) (2.41) 
Observations 4637 5793 5693 
Number of Firms 1028 1154 855 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D 
expenditures (R&D_Incr). All independent variable values are 
calculated as changes in that independent variable from year t - 
2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) 
include only Early, Middle, and Late LifeCycle firms, 
respectively. The Early, Middle, and Late LifeCycle groups 
include the lowest three, middle four, and highest three 
LifeCycle deciles from year t - 1, respectively. Deciles are 
formed on a yearly basis. 
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2.4.5 Are Potential Agency Problems a Factor? 
 
 According to agency-based theory, institutional investors will encourage 
R&D investment more in firms with good investment opportunities, but they will 
not encourage R&D investment more in firms with high free cash flow (unless the 
high free cash flow is accompanied by good investment opportunities). 
 I test this prediction using q as a proxy for investment opportunities. I sort 
the sample of firms each year into investment opportunity deciles. I assign each 
firm-year to one of three groups. Firms in the bottom three deciles (Low q) have 
poor investment opportunities, those in the next four deciles (Medium q) have 
moderate investment opportunities, and those in the highest three deciles (high 
q) have good investment opportunities.  
 The median R&D to sales ratio for firm-years in which the firm made an 
R&D investment in the low, medium, and high q groups are 2.75%, 5.66% and 
16.70% respectively. The percentage of firm-years in which the firm made an 
R&D investment in the low, medium, and high q groups are 34%, 49% and 65% 
respectively. Thus, firms with higher q’s (and better investment opportunities) are 
unsurprisingly prone to invest more and more often in R&D. 
 I run regressions using the firm and year fixed effects logit model (2-1) that 
shows the effect that changes in institutional ownership have on R&D investment 
increases in the subsequent year. Regressions are run on the low, medium, and 
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high q groups separately based on which group a firm is in during year t – 1. The 
results are shown in Table 2 - 7. 
 The first regression indicates that for firms with poor investment 
opportunities, there is not a significant relationship between institutional 
ownership changes and the probability of an R&D increase in the following year. 
The second and third regressions indicate that institutional investors encourage 
R&D investment increases in firms with moderate and good investment 
opportunities. These results are consistent with agency-based theory. 
Institutional investors appear to only use their influence to persuade 
management to increase R&D when sufficient investment opportunities exist. 
 Agency-based theory also predicts that institutional investors will not 
encourage higher R&D simply because high free cash flow increases the amount 
of discretionary cash that is available to management. I test this prediction by 
assigning each firm-year to one of three groups: low cash flow (bottom three 
deciles), moderate cash flow (middle four deciles), and high cash flow (top three 
deciles). Once again, I use the firm and year fixed effects logit model (2-1). The 
results are shown in Table 2 - 8. 
 The median R&D to sales ratio for firm-years in which the firm made an 
R&D investment in the low, medium, and high free cash flow groups are 24.34%, 
4.27% and 5.87% respectively. The percentage of firm-years in which the firm 
made an R&D investment in the low, medium, and high FCF groups are 56%, 
43% and 50% respectively. Thus, firms with the lowest free cash flow to asset 
ratios are prone to invest more and more often in R&D than the other two groups. 
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 The first and second regressions show that institutional investors have a 
positive effect on R&D investment in firms with low and medium free cash flow 
rates. The third regression indicates that institutional investors do not have a 
significant effect on R&D investment in firms with high free cash flow.  The 
pattern indicates that institutional investors’ encouragement of R&D investment 
does not increase as firm free cash flow rises. In fact, it wanes in the highest free 
cash flow firms. 
 The evidence indicates that an increase in institutional investors leads to 
an increase in R&D investment, especially in firms with good investment 
opportunities. Institutional investors do not encourage R&D investment in firms 
with high free cash flow. Therefore, institutional investors help to control agency 
problems by encouraging management to invest more in R&D in firms because 
good investment opportunities exist, but not simply because cash is available. 
 A robustness check using difference GMM confirms this result. An 
additional robustness check using a combination of investment opportunities and 
free cash flow is also supportive. Robustness checks are shown and discussed 
in Appendix B.  
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Table 2 - 7: Institutional Ownership, R&D, and Investment Opportunities 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Low q Medium q High q 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 0.3045 0.7199** 0.7077*** 
 (0.77) (2.54) (2.64) 
q -0.1544 -0.1929*** -0.0359*** 
 (1.49) (3.54) (3.77) 
Debt 0.0290 0.1851 -0.6954*** 
 (0.10) (1.05) (3.13) 
ROA 1.0324** 0.6358** 0.2255 
 (2.24) (2.18) (1.38) 
Insider 0.5603 -0.6163 -0.7136 
 (0.66) (1.06) (1.15) 
Insider2 0.1019 0.5233 1.1121 
 (0.09) (0.70) (1.31) 
MktCap 0.2639** 0.8201*** 0.6156*** 
 (2.53) (6.24) (7.93) 
CapEx 0.6142 0.0936 -0.1428 
 (1.01) (0.17) (0.44) 
FCF 0.2224 0.1549 0.0788 
 (1.49) (1.12) (0.63) 
Liquidity 0.0224 0.0296 -0.0082 
 (0.64) (1.27) (0.40) 
LifeCycle 0.0046* -0.0008 0.0001 
 (1.89) (1.37) (0.74) 
Revenue 0.1569 -0.1148 0.0238 
 (1.23) (1.09) (0.48) 
Observations 3019 6272 5507 
Number of Firms 676 1312 1108 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D 
expenditures (R&D_Incr). All independent variable values are 
calculated as changes in that independent variable from year t - 
2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) 
include only Low, Medium and High q firms, respectively. The 
Low, Medium and High q groups include the lowest three, 
middle four, and highest three Liquidity deciles from year t - 1, 
respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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Table 2 - 8: Institutional Ownership, R&D, and Free Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Low FCF Medium FCF High FCF 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 0.6301* 0.7130** 0.2497 
 (1.84) (2.45) (0.78) 
q -0.0273*** -0.0413* -0.0292 
 (2.62) (1.75) (0.92) 
Debt 0.0424 -0.6562* -0.3594 
 (0.63) (1.92) (0.89) 
ROA 0.3599** -0.2821 -0.7376** 
 (2.39) (0.76) (2.09) 
Insider 0.2562 -0.1966 -0.2641 
 (0.36) (0.31) (0.39) 
Insider2 -0.5947 0.5828 0.0960 
 (0.64) (0.71) (0.10) 
MktCap 0.5052*** 0.6855*** 0.4233*** 
 (6.78) (6.68) (3.34) 
CapEx 0.3918 0.3994 0.6130 
 (1.12) (0.84) (0.73) 
FCF 0.1237 0.0297 0.0732 
 (1.24) (0.33) (0.86) 
Liquidity -0.0001 -0.0095 -0.0271 
 (0.17) (0.43) (0.93) 
LifeCycle -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0007 
 (0.17) (0.40) (0.76) 
Revenue -0.0831* 0.0474 0.3471** 
 (1.75) (0.40) (2.00) 
Observations 3341 5458 4877 
Number of Firms 828 1245 967 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.04 0.03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D 
expenditures (R&D_Incr). All independent variable values are 
calculated as changes in that independent variable from year t - 
2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) 
include only Low, Medium and High FCF firms, respectively. 
The Low, Medium and High FCF groups include the lowest 
three, middle four, and highest three Liquidity deciles from year t 
- 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Research and development (R&D) investment is an important determinant 
of the future growth in revenue and earnings for many corporations. The amount 
of financial resources which are allocated to R&D is an important financial 
decision for those corporations and a key to survival for many of them. Since 
institutions own almost 70% of U.S. public corporations, their effect on R&D 
decisions is important to the success of U.S. corporations. In this paper, I test 
several hypotheses about the influence institutional investors have on R&D 
investment policy. 
I find that companies with higher institutional investor ownership, holding 
other factors constant, invest more in R&D than companies with lower 
institutional ownership. I find that an increase in institutional ownership leads to 
an increase in R&D investment.  
I expand a model that Edmans (2009) proposes about the effect of 
blockholders on long-term investment. In his model, blockholders make their 
trading decisions based on the fundamental value of the firm rather than current 
earnings. The superior monitoring ability of blockholders enables them to discern 
the benefit of the firm investing for the long-term to enhance firm value. 
Management, which is cognizant of the large shareholders’ ability to determine 
the firm’s true value, is thus encouraged to invest for the long-term rather than for 
short-term profits. Management can thus avoid a depressed stock share price 
that results from the blockholders divesting their shares if management chooses 
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to invest at a sub-optimal level. I argue that if institutional investors herd, they 
can have an impact similar to the one predicted of blockholders in this model. 
A prediction of the Edmans (2009) model is that the ability of large 
shareholders to encourage higher investment is enhanced by higher firm stock 
liquidity because the higher liquidity heightens the threat of divestment. I find that 
higher firm stock liquidity enhances the ability of institutional investors to use their 
influence to persuade management to increase their investment in R&D. Thus, 
my results support the Edmans (2009) model. 
Institutional investors are better informed than other investors. Institutional 
owners should be able to gauge the long-term benefit of R&D investment more 
precisely than non-institutional investors. Therefore, I propose a hypothesis that 
predicts that the positive relationship between institutional investors and future 
R&D investment will strengthen in firms with higher information asymmetry. My 
results support this prediction. I find that Institutional investors encourage higher 
R&D investment primarily in firms with high information asymmetry indicating 
they have an advantage in discerning the value of R&D investments in such 
firms. 
Firms with higher free cash flow and poor growth opportunities are 
susceptible to agency problems because they have higher discretionary funds 
that can be misused by management. Agency-based free cash flow theory 
predicts that if institutional investors are better monitors than other investors, they 
will encourage R&D investment in firms with good investment opportunities, but 
they will not encourage R&D investment simply because a firm has higher free 
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cash flow. My results support this prediction indicating that institutional investors 
help to control agency problems in R&D investment decisions.  
 Institutional investor increases precede increases in research and 
development (R&D) investment overall and specifically in firms with higher stock 
liquidity, higher information asymmetry, lower free cash flow, and better 
investment opportunities. Institutional investors effectively encourage 
management to pursue long-term R&D investment policies that are beneficial to 
shareholders.  
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Appendix A: Payout Robustness Tests 
 
 This appendix includes robustness checks for tests on the influence 
institutional investors have on payout policy. These robustness checks have 
been moved from the main text to this appendix to improve the flow and clarity of 
the main text. In all cases, results from the main text are supported. 
 The results in Table A - 1, Table A - 2, and Table A - 3 provide support for 
agency-based theory. Table A - 1 provides evidence that an increase in 
institutional ownership leads to an increase in total payout for two separate time 
periods: 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005. Table A - 2 indicates that an increase in 
institutional investors leads to a stronger increase in payouts in firms with poor 
investment opportunities and high free cash flow. Institutional investors do not 
have an effect on payouts in firms with good investment opportunities or low free 
cash flow.  
 I employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference linear GMM dynamic 
panel data methodology to obtain the results shown in Table A – 3. This 
difference GMM methodology attenuates endogeneity problems between 
dependent and independent variables. Difference GMM methodology is 
explained in greater detail in Appendix C. The results indicate that an increase in 
institutional shareholders leads to an increase in payouts, especially in firms with 
poor investment opportunities and high free cash flow. 
 Table A - 4 and Table A - 5 display results that provide evidence for the 
adverse selection theory. Table A - 4 demonstrates that an increase in 
institutional ownership precedes a subsequent increase in stock repurchases in 
both the 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005 time periods. Difference GMM is used to 
produce the results displayed in Table A - 5 which indicate that institutional 
investors encourage stock repurchases primarily in firms with higher information 
asymmetry. 
 Support for the substitution hypothesis is provided by the results displayed 
in Table A - 6 and Table A - 7. The substitution hypothesis asserts that the 
influence of institutional investors will lead to an increased percentage of total 
payout going towards repurchases. In Table A - 6, support is shown for the 
hypothesis in both the 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005 time periods, although the 
evidence is stronger and more convincing for the latter period. 
 The results for the earlier period are somewhat surprising since this time 
period is entirely included in Fama and French (2001) which finds a decrease in 
propensity to pay dividends and an increase in repurchases. A closer 
examination of their study indicates that during the 1990 – 1997 time period, the 
propensity to pay dividends changed very little (see Table 6 of their study). It also 
indicates that repurchases declined from the 1988 – 1992 period to the 1993 – 
1998 period (see Table 12 of their study). My results for the earlier time period 
seem less surprising in light of this information.  
 Still, the contrast between my weak results in the early time period and 
exceptionally strong results in the latter time period raises a question. Why? It 
could just be a result of the vagaries of the trend noted in Fama and French 
(2001). Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) showed that repurchases 
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are very cyclical with firms increasing stock repurchases after poor stock market 
performances. They also found that dividend increases were more common 
following good performance. Their findings could explain the different results for 
the two time periods.  
 Table A - 7 display results for difference GMM regressions using payout 
composition as the dependent variable. The results indicate that institutional 
investors encourage an increased use of stock repurchases as a percentage of 
total payout, especially in firms which previously used stock repurchases for 
more than 50% of their total payout.  
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Table A - 1: Payouts and Time Periods 
 (1) (2) 
 
1990 - 1997 1998 - 2005 
 
Payout Payout 
Inst 0.0118** 0.0138** 
 (2.21) (2.43) 
   q 0.0000 -0.0007*** 
 (0.30) (5.14) 
Debt -0.0501*** -0.0080** 
 (3.60) (2.47) 
Turnover -0.0000* -0.0012*** 
 (1.77) (2.87) 
LifeCycle 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (1.27) (1.14) 
MktCap 0.0040* 0.0098*** 
 (1.88) (6.74) 
ROA -0.0034** -0.0018*** 
 (2.07) (2.94) 
Insider -0.0243 -0.0184 
 (1.39) (1.24) 
Insider2 0.0281 0.0037 
 (1.64) (0.23) 
Revenue 0.0005 -0.0014 
 (0.36) (0.89) 
Observations 17682 27251 
Firms 4809 6128 
R-squared 0.13 0.22 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in total payout 
divided by book value of assets (Payout) by time period. All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in 
that independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regression 
(1) includes the years from 1990 to 1997. Regression (2) 
includes the years from 1998 to 2005. 
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Table A - 2: Payouts, Investment Opportunities, and Free Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High 
CashFlow    
Low q 
High 
CashFlow 
High q 
Low 
CashFlow 
Low q 
Low 
CashFlow 
High q 
 
Payout Payout Payout Payout 
Inst 0.0305** 0.0059 0.0033 0.0080 
 (2.00) (0.61) (0.54) (1.20) 
CashFlow -0.0005 0.0122** -0.0039 0.0019* 
 (0.53) (2.50) (1.63) (1.72) 
   q 0.0038 -0.0021*** 0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.87) (4.21) (0.42) (1.54) 
Debt -0.0638* -0.1122*** -0.0075 0.0000 
 (1.82) (5.66) (1.46) (0.01) 
Turnover -0.0054 -0.0016*** 0.0000 -0.0010* 
 (1.30) (3.07) (0.52) (1.90) 
LifeCycle -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.95) (0.29) (0.39) (0.11) 
MktCap 0.0128** 0.0225*** 0.0062* 0.0043** 
 (2.37) (7.20) (1.96) (2.09) 
ROA -0.0156 -0.0356*** 0.0043 -0.0022** 
 (0.93) (2.76) (0.73) (2.09) 
Insider -0.0082 -0.0134 0.0047 0.0027 
 (0.53) (0.73) (0.17) (0.18) 
Insider2 0.0087 0.0016 -0.0043 -0.0006 
 (0.51) (0.07) (0.16) (0.04) 
Revenue -0.0010 0.0055 -0.0071* -0.0003 
 (0.18) (1.45) (1.73) (0.21) 
Observations 10924 13122 11558 8632 
Number of Firms 3757 3831 4565 3496 
R-squared 0.49 0.20 0.42 0.77 
Robust t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect regressions of 
changes (from year t - 1 to t) in total payout divided by book value of assets 
(Payout). All independent variable values are calculated as changes in that 
independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions 
(1), (2), (3) and (4) include only firms that are in the High CashFlow and Low q, 
High CashFlow and High q, Low CashFlow and Low q, and Low CashFlow and 
High q groups, respectively. The Low CashFlow and High CashFlow groups 
include the lowest five and highest five CashFlow deciles, respectively. The Low 
q and High q groups include the lowest five and highest five q deciles from year 
t - 1, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. 
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Table A - 3: Payouts, Investment Opportunities and Free Cash Flow (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Firms Low q High q Low CashFlow 
High 
CashFlow 
 
Payout Payout Payout Payout Payout 
Inst 0.0199** 0.0150** 0.0205 0.0127 0.0266** 
 (2.37) (2.19) (1.56) (1.48) (2.33) 
Payout 0.0755 0.0585 0.0809*** 0.0492 0.1196*** 
 (2.35) (1.35) (2.56) (1.38) (3.30) 
   q -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0006 
 (0.49) (0.11) (0.30) (0.32) (0.23) 
Debt -0.4795 -0.0518 -0.0003 0.0343 -0.0848 
 (1.05) (1.18) (0.01) (0.83) (1.43) 
Turnover 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0041* 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.15) (0.24) (1.70) (0.61) (0.51) 
LifeCycle -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.93) (0.87) (0.93) (1.11) (0.84) 
MktCap -0.0069 -0.0164* 0.0041 -0.0122 0.0050 
 (0.62) (1.66) (0.28) (1.37) (0.33) 
ROA 0.0301 0.0318 0.0026 0.0408 0.0050 
 (1.26) (0.94) (0.14) (1.01) (0.17) 
Insider -0.1504** -0.0754 -0.1278 -0.0221 -0.1984 
 (1.99) (1.26) (1.21) (0.25) (2.05) 
Insider2 0.1619 0.0703 0.1386 -0.0092 0.2234* 
 (1.50) (1.01) (0.82) (0.08) (1.77) 
Revenue -0.0544*** -0.0102 -0.0374*** -0.0218 -0.0986 
 (4.07) (0.91) (3.04) (0.89) (4.29) 
Observations 35255 18203 17052 16320 20387 
Number of Firms 6796 4897 4532 5393 5129 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
J p-value 0.161 0.899 0.106 0.530 0.182 
AR(2) p-value 0.190 0.296 0.161 0.187 0.585 
Inst lag limits None None None 3 None 
Payout lag limits None None None None None 
Robust z stats in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  This table reports estimates generated by Arellano-Bond difference GMM of changes 
(from year t - 1 to t) in total payout divided by book value of assets (Payout). All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in that independent variable from 
year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (2) and (3) include only Low and High 
q firms (the lowest and highest five q deciles from year t - 1), respectively. Sample firms 
used in regressions (4) and (5) include only Low and High CashFlow firms (the lowest and 
highest five CashFlow deciles from year t - 1), respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly 
basis. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(2) is the Arellano-
Bond test of second-order autocorrelation in the errors. Independent variables Inst and 
Payout are instrumented using GMM-type instrument lags. All available lags are used 
unless validity tests are rejected, in which case lags are restricted to the highest number 
of lags which produce a valid model. 
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Table A - 4: Repurchases and Time Period 
 (1) (2) 
 
1990 - 1997 1998 - 2005 
 
Repurch Repurch 
Inst 0.0065* 0.0152*** 
 (1.89) (2.87) 
   q -0.0000 -0.0006*** 
 (0.29) (4.64) 
Debt -0.0279*** -0.0079** 
 (4.46) (2.49) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.0010** 
 (1.52) (2.56) 
LifeCycle 0.0000 -0.0000*** 
 (0.78) (2.60) 
MktCap 0.0038*** 0.0077*** 
 (4.44) (6.12) 
ROA -0.0020* -0.0016*** 
 (1.67) (2.85) 
Insider -0.0087 -0.0156 
 (1.16) (1.31) 
Insider2 0.0117 0.0085 
 (1.53) (0.65) 
Revenue 0.0014* -0.0017 
 (1.72) (1.13) 
Observations 17721 27405 
Firms 4813 6157 
R-squared 0.11 0.26 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in repurchases 
divided by book value of assets (Repurch) by time period. All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in 
that independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regression 
(1) includes the years from 1990 to 1997. Regression (2) 
includes the years from 1998 to 2005. 
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Table A - 5: Repurchases and Firm Life-cycle (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
All Firms Early 
 LifeCycle 
Late 
 LifeCycle 
 
Repurch Repurch Repurch 
Inst 0.0181** 0.0178** 0.0090 
 (2.08) (2.00) (1.03) 
Repurch 0.0665** -0.0161 0.0553** 
 (2.31) (0.27) (2.00) 
   q -0.0014 0.0029 0.0029 
 (0.87) (1.12) (1.01) 
Debt -0.0677 -0.0097 -0.0348 
 (1.34) (0.22) (0.76) 
Turnover -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.14) (0.48) (0.19) 
LifeCycle -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.98) (0.16) (0.18) 
MktCap -0.0014 -0.0317* -0.0031 
 (0.12) (1.68) (0.22) 
ROA -0.0125 -0.0049 0.0282 
 (0.43) (0.20) (1.25) 
Insider -0.0948 -0.0864 -0.0790 
 (1.17) (0.85) (0.66) 
Insider2 0.0714 0.0970 0.1026 
 (0.64) (0.62) (0.53) 
Revenue -0.0492*** 0.0252 -0.0916*** 
 (3.59) (1.16) (3.65) 
Observations 35430 15167 20981 
Number of Firms 6823 4359 4285 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
J p-value 0.140 0.902 0.466 
AR(2) p-value 0.404 0.349 0.458 
Inst lag limits 3 3 3 
Repurch lag limits None 3 None 
Robust z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  This table reports estimates generated by Arellano-Bond difference GMM of 
changes (from year t - 1 to t) in repurchases divided by book value of assets 
(Repurch). All independent variable values are calculated as changes in that 
independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample firms used in regressions (2) and 
(3) include only Early and Late LifeCycle firms, respectively. The Early and Late 
LifeCycle groups include the lowest and highest five LifeCycle deciles from year t - 1, 
respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly basis. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test of second-order 
autocorrelation in the errors. Independent variables Inst and Repurch are 
instrumented using GMM-type instrument lags. All available lags are used unless 
validity tests are rejected, in which case lags are restricted to the highest number of 
lags which produce a valid model. 
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Table A - 6: Payout Composition and Time Period 
 (1) (2) 
 
1990 - 1997 1998 - 2005 
 
PayComp PayComp 
Inst 0.1695 0.3920*** 
 (1.55) (4.28) 
   q -0.0224 -0.0160** 
 (1.17) (2.03) 
Debt -1.0381*** -0.8678*** 
 (6.17) (7.01) 
Turnover -0.0707*** 0.0199 
 (3.03) (1.60) 
LifeCycle -0.0045 -0.0000*** 
 (1.27) (5.23) 
MktCap 0.2622*** 0.2691*** 
 (4.42) (7.60) 
ROA -0.2876 -0.1346 
 (1.54) (0.95) 
Insider -0.2815 -0.1641 
 (1.42) (0.80) 
Insider2 0.3399 -0.0744 
 (1.35) (0.27) 
Revenue 0.1279** 0.0547 
 (2.25) (1.20) 
Observations 6937 8996 
Firms 1874 2541 
R-squared 0.16 0.19 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect 
regressions of changes (from year t - 1 to t) in a measure of 
payout composition (PayComp). PayComp is equal to -1 if 
payout is composed entirely of dividends and 1 if payout is 
composed entirely of stock repurchases. All independent 
variable values are calculated as changes in that 
independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regression (1) 
includes the years from 1990 to 1997. Regression (2) 
includes the years from 1998 to 2005. 
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Table A - 7: Payout Composition (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
All Firms Dividends > Repurchases 
at year t - 2 
Dividends ≤ Repurchases 
at year t - 2 
 
PayComp PayComp PayComp 
Inst 0.1522* 0.2270 0.6629** 
 (1.80) (1.46) (2.42) 
PayComp 0.2868*** 0.3703*** -0.0287 
 (9.40) (4.10) (0.17) 
   q -0.1498* -0.2565 0.1344 
 (1.95) (1.52) (0.51) 
Debt -0.6513 -1.9627 -5.7731** 
 (1.01) (1.49) (2.22) 
Turnover -0.1335** -0.3778** -0.1906 
 (2.16) (2.05) (0.94) 
LifeCycle -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0000 
 (0.90) (0.03) (0.01) 
MktCap 0.3528 0.6304 -1.4589 
 (1.45) (1.37) (1.63) 
ROA 0.7810 -0.9096 -4.2384 
 (0.90) (0.48) (1.28) 
Insider 0.6801 0.5352 -1.2360 
 (0.70) (0.26) (0.39) 
Insider2 -1.4212 -0.1379 1.2102 
 (1.01) (0.05) (0.24) 
Revenue -0.4184 0.5868 1.6611 
 (1.62) (1.15) (1.24) 
Observations 11911 8328 3583 
Number of Firms 2355 1700 1489 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
J p-value 0.168 0.558 0.612 
AR(2) p-value 0.121 0.389 0.103 
Inst lag limits 2 3 1 
PayComp lag limits None 1 1 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates generated by Arellano-Bond difference GMM of changes (from 
year t - 1 to t) in in a measure of payout composition (PayComp). PayComp is equal to -1 if 
payout is composed entirely of dividends and 1 if payout is composed entirely of stock 
repurchases. All independent variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regression (2) includes only firms in which dividends 
exceeded repurchases in year t - 2 and regression (3) includes only firms in which 
repurchases exceeded dividends in year t - 2. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions. AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation in the errors. 
Independent variables Inst and PayComp are instrumented using GMM-type instrument lags. 
All available lags are used unless validity tests are rejected, in which case lags are restricted 
to the highest number of lags which produce a valid model. 
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 Appendix B: R&D Robustness Tests 
 
 Robustness checks for tests on the influence that institutional investors 
have on investment in R&D are included in this appendix. These checks have 
been moved here to improve the clarity and flow of the main text. In all cases, 
results from the main text are supported. 
 Previous results indicate that an increase in institutional ownership leads 
to a subsequent R&D investment increase. A logical inference from this result is 
that institutional owners will discourage R&D decreases. The results in Table B - 
1 confirm that institutional investors dissuade R&D cuts. Table B - 2 provides 
evidence that higher institutional ownership results in increased R&D for two 
separate time periods: 1990 – 1997 and 1998 – 2005. 
 I use the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference linear GMM dynamic panel 
data methodology to obtain the results displayed in Table B - 3. This 
methodology alleviates endogeneity problems. Difference GMM is a linear 
method so I use changes in R&D to assets as my dependent variable when using 
this method. Difference GMM methodology is explained in greater detail in 
Appendix C. The results indicate that a rise in institutional investors leads to a 
rise in R&D investment, especially for firms with high stock liquidity or high 
information asymmetry. 
 I use an alternate proxy for information asymmetry, R&D intensity (R&D to 
total assets) instead of firm life-cycle (retained earnings to the book value of total 
equity) to produce the results shown in Table B - 4. Firms with high R&D intensity 
have higher information asymmetry. The results indicate that institutional 
investors encourage R&D in firms with high and low information asymmetry, but 
this effect appears stronger in firms with high information asymmetry. 
 The difference GMM regressions shown in Table B – 5 indicate that an 
increase in institutional investors leads to increased R&D in firms with good 
investment opportunities and low free cash flow. Institutional investors have no 
significant effect on R&D in firms with poor investment opportunities or high free 
cash flow.  
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Table B - 1: R&D Decreases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Firms All Firms 
No R&D 
Decr. in 
year t - 2 
R&D Decr. 
in  
year t - 2 
 
R&D_Decr R&D_Decr R&D_Decr R&D_Decr 
Inst 
 -0.8551*** -0.6268*** -0.9682*** 
 
 (5.54) (2.91) (3.30) 
q 0.0492*** 0.0461*** 0.0554*** 0.0521*** 
 (5.70) (5.37) (3.91) (3.53) 
Debt 0.0359 0.0470 0.2919 -0.2044 
 (0.55) (0.70) (1.56) (1.53) 
ROA -0.2533** -0.2658*** -0.2621 0.0181 
 (2.50) (2.63) (1.42) (0.13) 
Insider -0.1508 -0.1669 -0.9825** 0.4669 
 (0.45) (0.49) (1.96) (0.78) 
Insider2 0.0302 0.0541 1.0471 -0.9110 
 (0.07) (0.12) (1.61) (1.13) 
MktCap -0.6769*** -0.6399*** -0.6934*** -0.6477*** 
 (15.35) (14.39) (9.85) (8.55) 
CapEx -0.3083 -0.2568 0.1101 -0.4327 
 (1.38) (1.15) (0.37) (0.99) 
FCF -0.1100** -0.1088** -0.1227 -0.1785* 
 (2.02) (2.00) (1.26) (1.81) 
Liquidity 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0204 0.0001 
 (0.24) (0.23) (1.10) (0.18) 
LifeCycle -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0021** -0.0001 
 (0.50) (0.48) (2.00) (0.72) 
Revenue -0.0461 -0.0374 -0.1426** 0.0351 
 (1.24) (1.00) (2.35) (0.59) 
Observations 18440 18215 9858 5389 
Number of Firms 2781 2768 1993 1444 
Pseudo R-sqr. 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit regressions of 
decreases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D expenditures (R&D_Incr). All 
independent variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions (1) and (2) include all firms. 
Regression (3) includes only firms that had no R&D decrease in year t - 2 and 
regression (4) includes only firms that had an R&D decrease in year t - 2. 
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Table B - 2: R&D and Time Period 
 (1) (2) 
 
1990 - 1997 1998 - 2005 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 0.8601*** 0.8353*** 
 (2.73) (4.30) 
q -0.0797*** -0.0290*** 
 (3.17) (3.46) 
Debt -0.7951** -0.0231 
 (2.27) (0.33) 
ROA 0.8265** 0.1590 
 (2.30) (1.36) 
Insider -0.8434 0.5605 
 (1.36) (1.28) 
Insider2 1.2460* -0.7551 
 (1.66) (1.24) 
MktCap 0.5291*** 0.5797*** 
 (4.93) (11.33) 
CapEx -0.2828 0.5615* 
 (0.67) (1.77) 
FCF 0.5970** 0.1402** 
 (2.46) (2.04) 
Liquidity -0.0001 0.0215* 
 (0.13) (1.65) 
LifeCycle 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.21) (0.78) 
Revenue -0.0477 0.0572 
 (0.57) (1.27) 
Observations 4888 10919 
Number of Firms 1236 2126 
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.06 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D 
expenditures (R&D_Incr) by time period. All independent 
variable values are calculated as changes in that independent 
variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regression (1) includes the 
years from 1990 to 1997. Regression (2) includes the years 
from 1998 to 2005. 
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Table B - 3: R&D, Stock Liquidity and Firm Life-cycle (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All Firms Low Liquidity 
High 
Liquidity 
Early 
LifeCycle 
Late 
LifeCycle 
 
R&D_Assets R&D_Assets R&D_Assets R&D_Assets R&D_Assets 
Inst 0.0744** 0.0275 0.0713* 0.0950* 0.0537 
 (2.02) (0.39) (1.85) (1.73) (0.95) 
R&D_Assets 0.2364** -0.0375 0.1785** 0.2167** -0.0971 
 (2.43) (0.20) (2.12) (2.45) (0.55) 
q 0.0392*** 0.0431* 0.0268*** 0.0357*** 0.0415* 
 (2.73) (1.80) (3.89) (3.77) (1.95) 
Debt -0.0442 0.0301 0.0395 0.1095 -0.0130 
 (0.29) (1.19) (0.29) (0.63) (0.28) 
ROA 0.1129 0.0697** -0.1460 -0.0665 0.0741 
 (1.21) (2.13) (1.58) (0.62) (1.15) 
Insider 0.9170* -0.1522 0.7406 0.6558* -0.0378 
 (1.72) (0.46) (1.54) (1.79) (0.07) 
Insider2 -1.6853** 0.4782 -1.3710** -1.2905** -0.0613 
 (2.15) (1.00) (2.02) (2.18) (0.08) 
MktCap -0.1634** -0.2276* -0.1101** -0.1351*** -0.1605 
 (2.49) (1.70) (2.25) (2.99) (1.43) 
CapEx -0.0658 0.9977* 0.0609 -0.1652 0.5296 
 (0.30) (1.81) (0.31) (0.45) (1.60) 
FCF -0.0575 -0.0324 0.0387 0.0729 -0.0562 
 (0.61) (0.90) (0.48) (1.02) (0.77) 
Liquidity 0.0000 -0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.01) (0.68) 
LifeCycle 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 
 (0.22) (0.03) (0.02) (0.21) (0.74) 
Revenue 0.0074 -0.0313 0.0506* 0.1379*** -0.0850 
 (0.21) (1.08) (1.82) (3.04) (1.45) 
Observations 14341 5987 8354 6759 7859 
Firms 3127 1931 2276 2029 1768 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
J p-value 0.343 0.862 0.307 0.676 0.569 
AR(2) p-value 0.610 0.129 0.958 0.189 0.213 
Inst lag limits None 3 None None None 
R&D lag limit 3 None 3 1 None 
Robust z stats in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates generated by difference GMM of changes (from year t - 1 to t) 
in R&D expenditures divided by assets (R&D_Assets). All independent variable values are 
changes from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions (2) and (3) include only Low and High Liquidity 
firms (the lowest and highest five deciles from year t - 1), respectively. Regressions (4) and 
(5) include only Early and Late LifeCycle firms, respectively. Deciles are formed on a yearly 
basis. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(2) is the Arellano-
Bond test of second-order autocorrelation in the errors. Independent variables Inst and 
R&D_Assets are instrumented using GMM-type instrument lags. The maximum available 
lags which produce a valid model are used. 
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Table B - 4: R&D and R&D Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Low 
R&D_Assets 
Medium 
R&D_Assets 
High 
R&D_Assets 
 
R&D_Incr R&D_Incr R&D_Incr 
Inst 0.6061* 0.6958** 1.3596*** 
 (1.90) (2.48) (4.41) 
q -0.0992* -0.1526*** -0.0467*** 
 (1.71) (5.61) (4.22) 
Debt -0.1701 -0.1101 0.0520 
 (0.52) (0.37) (0.45) 
ROA 0.2177 0.8210** -0.0103 
 (0.50) (2.47) (0.06) 
Insider -0.7198 0.1148 0.8346 
 (1.08) (0.18) (1.15) 
Insider2 0.9051 -0.0948 -0.9809 
 (1.05) (0.11) (1.00) 
MktCap 0.7306*** 0.9929*** 0.7954*** 
 (5.15) (9.19) (9.95) 
CapEx 0.8465 0.7958 0.8958** 
 (1.45) (1.62) (1.97) 
FCF 0.0500 0.1900 0.4066*** 
 (1.05) (1.25) (2.76) 
Liquidity 0.0199 0.0156 -0.0001 
 (0.49) (0.83) (0.16) 
LifeCycle 0.0036 0.0003 -0.0000 
 (1.50) (0.84) (0.09) 
Revenue 0.0361 0.1874* 0.0331 
 (0.26) (1.69) (0.60) 
Observations 4848 6044 3856 
Number of Firms 828 1145 817 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.12 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates of firm and year fixed effect logit 
regressions of increases (from year t - 1 to t) in R&D expenditures 
(R&D_Incr). All independent variable values are calculated as 
changes in that independent variable from year t - 2 to t - 1. Sample 
firms used in regressions (1), (2), and (3) include only Low, Medium 
and High R&D_Assets firms, respectively. The Low, Medium and 
High R&D_Assets groups include the lowest three, middle four, and 
highest three Liquidity deciles from year t - 1, respectively. Deciles 
are formed on a yearly basis. 
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Table B - 5: R&D, Investment Opportunities and Free Cash Flow (GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Low q High q Low CashFlow 
High 
CashFlow 
 
R&D_Assets R&D_Assets R&D_Assets R&D_Assets 
Inst 0.0098 0.0679* 0.1319** 0.0177 
 (0.50) (1.84) (2.31) (1.27) 
R&D_Assets 0.0416 0.2505** 0.1845* 0.1843*** 
 (0.33) (2.48) (1.93) (3.09) 
q 0.0271 0.0401*** 0.0404** 0.0149*** 
 (1.44) (2.65) (2.37) (4.47) 
Debt 0.0574* 0.0011 0.1759 0.0745 
 (1.83) (0.02) (1.29) (1.17) 
ROA 0.2186* 0.1417* 0.0939 -0.0200 
 (1.72) (1.76) (1.01) (0.75) 
Insider -0.1224 1.0092** 0.4731 0.1663 
 (0.42) (2.52) (1.11) (1.10) 
Insider2 0.0528 -1.7979*** -1.0685 -0.2886 
 (0.13) (2.65) (1.49) (1.17) 
MktCap -0.0502* -0.1706*** -0.1673** -0.0371** 
 (1.72) (3.11) (2.29) (2.07) 
CapEx 0.0911 -0.1571 0.0591 -0.0631 
 (0.53) (0.89) (0.27) (0.54) 
FCF -0.0517 -0.1097 -0.0388 -0.0034 
 (1.32) (1.13) (0.43) (0.37) 
Liquidity 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0037 
 (0.72) (0.59) (0.68) (1.06) 
LifeCycle -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0000 
 (1.08) (0.71) (0.56) (1.18) 
Revenue 0.0033 0.0361 -0.0223 -0.0025 
 (0.06) (1.27) (0.77) (0.11) 
Observations 5966 9045 6231 8110 
Number of Firms 1867 2409 2355 2228 
Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
J p-value 0.505 0.181 0.673 0.247 
AR(2) p-value 0.349 0.431 0.520 0.164 
Inst lag limits None None None None 
R&D lag limits None None 3 3 
Robust z stats in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  This table reports estimates generated by difference GMM of changes (from year t - 1 
to t) in R&D expenditures divided assets (R&D_Assets). Independent variable values are 
changes from year t - 2 to t - 1. Regressions (1) and (2) include only Low and High q 
firms (the lowest and highest five deciles from year t - 1), respectively. Regressions (3) 
and (4) include only Low and High CashFlow firms, respectively. Deciles are formed on 
a yearly basis. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(2) is the 
Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation in the errors. Independent variables 
Inst and R&D_Assets are instrumented using GMM-type instrument lags. The maximum 
available lags which produce a valid model are used. 
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Appendix C: Difference GMM Methodology 
 
 Some of the robustness checks that I use in this paper use a difference 
generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology that is based on the 
methodology employed in Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988). Refinements 
and validity tests developed in Arellano and Bond (1991) are also used. I 
implement the methodology using the Stata command xtabond2 which was 
developed by David Roodman. This command and its proper implementation are 
described in great detail by Roodman (2007).  
 Difference GMM removes fixed effects and uses lagged values of the 
dependent variable and independent variables of interest as instruments. This 
method avoids endogeneity problems associated with using fixed-effects when 
there is autocorrelation in the dependent variable. It also corrects for any 
concurrent endogeneity problems associated with the inclusion of lagged 
independent variables. 
 Recently, many notable research papers have used difference GMM in 
their analysis including Gupta (2005), Cuñat (2007), and Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (2009). Almeida, Campello, and Galvao (2010) assess the performance 
of difference GMM and find that its results conform to theoretical expectations in 
regressions that use data which contains firm-fixed effects and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 This difference GMM methodology is designed for use with panel data 
containing few time periods and a large number of individuals or firms. My data 
consists of a maximum of 16 years of data for over 10,000 firms. Difference 
GMM is also designed to be implemented in situations with the following 
characteristics: a dependent variable that depends on past realizations of itself, 
independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, and firm fixed effects 
(Roodman (2007)). If conceptually and statistically sound instruments for 
endogenous independent variables are available, firm-fixed effects regressions 
using those instruments would be preferable to using difference GMM. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to find valid instruments. Difference GMM uses lags 
of the endogenous regressors as instruments. The use of lags as instruments 
shrinks the size of the dataset because at least one year of data has to be 
dropped for each firm. In my implementation of difference GMM, only one year 
has to be dropped for each firm. 
 The dependent variables in my regressions depend on past realizations 
because current payout policy is largely dependent on past payout policy and 
current R&D investment policy is largely dependent on past R&D policy. In my 
robustness checks that use difference GMM, the independent variables of 
interest are assumed to be endogenous. In fact, the main purpose of my 
difference GMM robustness checks is to control for the potential (and likely) 
endogenous relationship between payout policy and institutional ownership or 
between R&D investment policy and institutional ownership. 
 My implementation of difference GMM starts with the following basic 
model which will be transformed by the difference GMM process. 
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(C-1) itiitititit ControlInstPolicyPolicy ενβ ++•++= −−− 111  
 
 In this model, Policyit represents the change in the firm policy that I am 
using as a dependent variable in a given regression: either payout, repurchases, 
payout composition or R&D to assets. Policyit-1 represents the change in that firm 
policy in the previous year. The independent variable Instit-1 represents the 
change in institutional ownership percentage in the previous year. Controlit-1 
represents a vector of time-varying firm level control variables. Year dummies are 
included as control variables to remove time-related shocks that affect all firms. 
Firm-specific (fixed effects) errors are represented by νi and εit represents a time-
varying observation-specific error term.  
 Several econometric problems which are endemic to model C-1 can be 
corrected by difference GMM. The change in institutional ownership percentage 
(Instit-1) is assumed to be endogenous. Therefore, it is instrumented with lagged 
changes in institutional ownership. This predetermines the institutional ownership 
variable thus rendering it uncorrelated with the error term. Similarly, the use of 
the lagged dependent variable (Policyit-1) as an independent variable leads to 
autocorrelation. This variable is also instrumented with lags of itself. Firm-fixed 
effects are contained in the error term νi. The difference GMM methodology uses 
first-differences to transform model C-1 thus removing the firm-fixed effects error 
term because it is time invariant. The new model is shown below. 
 
(C-2) ititititit ControlInstPolicyPolicy εβ ∆+∆•+∆+∆=∆ −−− 111  
 
 The transformed model addresses potential causation and endogeneity 
problems that may exist in the relationship between the policy and institutional 
ownership. Firm-fixed effects are differenced out. Institutional ownership changes 
predate policy changes indicating causation. Previous policy changes are 
controlled for decreasing the probability that coefficients for changes in 
institutional ownership are simply a result of previous policy changes. Potentially 
endogenous independent variables are instrumented to control for endogeneity. 
 I was able to use the first lag of independent policy and institutional 
variables in all my regressions as an instrument. In the difference GMM model, 
efficiency can be improved by including additional lags. Including the additional 
lags introduces new information which is useful to the model. In conventional 
two-stage least squares regressions, including additional lags shrinks the sample 
size which means additional efficiency comes at a steep cost. Difference GMM 
does not suffer from this trade-off. In difference GMM, additional lags can be 
included as instruments when available without shrinking the sample size. 
Therefore, it is generally preferable to include as many lags as instruments as 
possible. I use this tactic. 
 Unfortunately, the inclusion of additional lags as instruments is not 
problem-free. Too many instruments can result in overidentification of the model 
invalidating its results. Therefore, if tests indicate that a model is overidentified, I 
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reduce the number of lags used until the tests no longer indicate that the model 
is overidentified. 
 I employ two important tests of difference GMM model validity which are 
strongly recommended by Roodman (2007) among others: the Hansen-Sargan 
J-test and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in differenced 
residuals. For both tests, a higher p-value indicates a valid model while p-values 
of less than 0.10 indicate an invalid model. 
 The null hypothesis of the Hansen-Sargan J-test is that the instruments as 
a group are exogenous. A rejection of this null hypothesis indicates an invalid 
model. Therefore, I do not use any model in which the p-value for the J-test is 
less than 0.10. 
 The J statistic’s ability to detect overidentification can be weakened by too 
many instruments. A general rule of thumb is that the number of firms in the 
panel should outnumber the number of instruments used in a difference GMM 
regression. The minimum number of firms for any regression I run is 1,489 while 
the maximum number of instruments is 208 indicating that the J statistic should 
retain its ability to detect overidentification in all of these regressions. 
 AR(1) autocorrelation in differenced residuals is expected. This is because 
the difference between an error term (εit) and the error term from the year before 
(εit-1) is expected to be related to the difference between the error term from the 
year before (εit-1) and the error term from two years before (εit-2) because both 
differences contain the error term from the year before (εit-1). The Arellano-Bond 
test for second-order autocorrelation is more important because AR(2) 
autocorrelation indicates an invalid model. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
autocorrelation. Therefore, I do not use any models in which the null is rejected 
at the 10% level.  
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